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This study explores elite consensus among the political elites across the African National Congress 
(ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) on the land 
redistribution question in South Africa. Data for this study was gathered through parliamentary 
committee meetings, parliamentary caucus meetings, policy documents, and party manifestos from 
2018 to 2020.  
This study analysed the media statements, reports, caucus meetings and policy documents of each 
political party separately. This was done to identify each party’s values, opinions and behaviours in 
relation to procedural and institutional consensus and consensus on core values and agreement over 
vital policy matters. The premise of this thesis is that the styles of engagement among these elites 
hinder the progress of land reform because elites across the ANC, the DA and the EFF are 
uncooperative, antagonistic and uncompromising on their values and opinions in relation to land 
reform.  However, political elites have carried out their debated within the democratic framework, 
even though it is somewhat robust and frictional. Robust and frictional interaction between political 
elites during debates should not be confused with a lack of agreement on the rules of the game.  
From this set of findings, it is concluded that political elites in South Africa can be considered 
“consensually unified” in relation to the codes of conduct and rules of the political system. Moreover, 
all political elites in South Africa have the chance to get involved in central decision-making that 
provides effective and reliable access to one another. However, political elites do not agree on how 
the land question should be addressed. This lack of agreement among the political elites across the 
ANC, the DA and the EFF continues to hinder the progress of land redistribution. The existing lack 
of agreement on some ideological (values) issues is not sufficient to undermine elite consensus on 












Hierdie studie ondersoek elite-konsensus onder die politieke elite in die African National Congress 
(ANC), die Demokratiese Alliansie (DA) en die Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) oor die 
grondherverdelingsvraagstuk in Suid-Afrika. Gegewens vir hierdie studie is versamel deur 
vergaderings van die parlementêre komitees, politieke elite-onderhoude, parlementêre 
koukusvergaderings, beleidsdokumente en partymanifeste, vanaf 2018 - 2020. 
Hierdie studie het die mediaverklarings, verslae, onderhoude, koukusvergaderings en 
beleidsdokumente van elke politieke party afsonderlik ontleed. Dit is gedoen om die waardes, 
menings en gedrag van elke party te identifiseer met betrekking tot prosedurele en institusionele 
konsensus en konsensus oor kernwaardes en ooreenkoms oor belangrike beleidsaangeleenthede. Die 
uitgangspunt van hierdie tesis is dat die styl van betrokkenheid by hierdie elite die vordering van 
grondhervorming   vertraag omdat elites regoor die ANC, die DA en die EFF nie samewerking toon 
nie, antagonisties en kompromisloos is oor hul waardes en menings in verband met grondhervorming. 
Terwyl elite binne die parlementêre arena saamwerk en mekaar verdra, aanvaar sommige elite-
groeperings mekaar nie noodwendig as wettige deelnemers aan die politieke proses nie. Verder is 
daar min ooreenkoms  oor die wettigheid van die huidige grondwetlike bestel ten opsigte van die 
kwessie van grondhervorming.  
Uit hierdie stel bevindings word die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat politieke elite in Suid-Afrika as 
'konsensueel verenig' kan word in terme van die gedragskodes en reëls van die politieke stelsel. 
Boonop het alle politieke elite in Suid-Afrika die geleentheid om deel te neem aan sentrale 
besluitneming wat effektiewe en betroubare toegang tot mekaar bied. Politieke elite is nie in  
ooreenkoms oor hoe die grondvraagstuk aangespreek moet word nie. Hierdie gebrek aan ooreenkoms 









Values: Things that are believed to be important. It determines one’s priorities, standards or principles 
of behaviour  
Vision: This can be defined as the optimal desired future state of being; a clear sense of purpose. It 
should not be confused as the same as goals or objectives. A vision helps defines the goals set by 
establishing a framework to evaluate those goals by.  
Agreement: A situation in which individuals/groups share the same opinion, or in which they all 
accept or approve of something  
Consensus: A generally accepted decision or opinion among different groups of people  
Legitimate: Allowed/accepted by the law  
Constitution: A set of political principles by which a regime is governed, especially in accordance to 
the rights of the citizens the regime governs  
Expropriation: The act of taking away property/money, for the purpose of public interest without 
payment to the owner   
Beneficiaries: An individual or group who receives advantages as a result of something  
Policy: Set of plans or an idea of what to do in certain situations that has been deemed important by 
political parties, governments or business organizations 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and rationale 
The legacy of colonialism and apartheid left many citizens without the opportunity to own land. 
Unequal land distribution in South Africa can be traced to the seventeenth century when colonialism 
began. The Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 restrained black South Africans from owning land outside 
the Homelands that were designated to them, restricting them further and resulting in the majority of 
the South African population being landless. The Native Trust and Land Act 8 of 1936 not only stated 
what kind of farming was permitted within these areas but also formed the foundation upon which 
forceful removal of black South Africans took place. Black South Africans who managed to keep 
their land were dispossessed in accordance to the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (Bosman, 2007: 2).    
Unequal land distribution is still evident in democratic South Africa. While there have been 
acknowledgements, plans and Green Papers on land reform issues, the government has been slow to 
make genuine progress in terms of land restitution and redistribution (The Big Debate, 2017). The 
“government relied heavily on the concept of ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’” (WBWS) (Lahiff, 2007: 
1577). Since 1994, the government has strongly adopted pro-market approaches to land.  However, 
according to Stuart Wilson, “willing-buyer, willing-seller was never going to cut it” because “markets 
in any event create inequality; they do not ameliorate it” (Wilson, 2018). The expropriation of land 
has become a major policy option to redistribute housing and land (Wilson, 2018).  
In February 2018, there was a motion in parliament to amend the Constitution to allow for the 
expropriation of land without compensation (News 24, 2018). Ramaphosa explained how land 
expropriation will be implemented when he appeared before the National Assembly in August 2018 
stating that land owned by various government entities, such as local government, does not need to 
be bought and should be “serviced and released to the people as a form of expropriation” (News24, 
2018). Ramaphosa stated that with the releasing of land and the expropriation of land, government 
should be able to reach the land reform policy target of 30 percent (News24, 2018). The release of 
government-owned land and land owned by individuals will be dealt with in accordance with the 
Constitution (News24, 2018). Sticking to land reform policy as it currently stands, “protects the rights 
of the landless and landowners, thus upholding the rule of law” (Masinga and Hammond, 2008).  
There are many factors that have contributed to current land reform policies not achieving the 
preferred outcomes. Included here is “state ineptness including”, the underspending “of budgets, lack 
of capacity and a lack of” consensus among political elites on land reform in the country (Bosman, 




Key challenges appear to be the extent of disagreement among the political elite across the largest 
political parties, the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), on how to move forward with land reform. On the one hand, the 
DA firmly opposes land expropriation without compensation. The DA supports land distribution and 
land restitution and their aim is to make individuals “real property owners” (Maimane, 2018). The 
DA believes in the “promise of constitutional compact” and that section 25 of the Constitution should 
not be amended. Section 25 deals with property and property rights and states that land may not be 
expropriated without compensation but can be deprived arbitrarily or capriciously; it should be done 
in relation to the law (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). According to Maimane, 
the Constitution should not be seen as an “impediment to effective land reform” (2018). On the other 
hand, in March 2018, the national discourse in Parliament was dominated by the EFF’s motion to 
amend the Constitution to “pave the way for expropriation of all private property” (Maimane, 2018). 
This was reinforced by the ANC.  
The EFF’s election manifesto has jobs and land as its main focus, “with the state as the custodian of 
all land in the country” (Mahlakoana and Marrian, 2019). The ANC’s opinion on land reform is 
different from this because the party focuses on property ownership rights and the security of land 
and will only allow for the expropriation without compensation under strict conditions (Mahlakoana 
and Marrian, 2019). However, the EFF has pushed for all land, including private property, to be 
expropriated without compensation, and for the land to be nationalised (Mahlakoana and Marrian, 
2019). Changes to the Constitution can only be done with a two-thirds majority, which the ANC 
cannot achieve on its own. The DA has stated that it will oppose any amendments to the constitution 
that threaten the ownership of private property (Maimane, 2019).  
One of the main reasons why this study focuses on the ANC, the DA and the EFF is because the 
individuals within these political parties are much more involved, interested and more influential 
within the public domain regarding public policy and decision-making that directly affects the 
political system (Putnam, 1971: 651). This study will examine the similarities and differences in 
values and policy positions on land reform across the political elites within the ANC, the DA and the 
EFF. This is done by examining each political party’s manifestos, policies and speeches. In other 
words, this study analyses the three major parties’ policies on land reform and the consequences of 
their differences for building elite consensus in South Africa.  
The aim of this study is to determine whether there is sufficient consensus among political elites to 
make a land reform policy viable in South Africa. This study will attempt to determine the extent of 
elite consensus on land reform across the major political elite groupings using appropriate theoretical 




key aspects of the land reform debate such as expropriation without compensation, and the need for 
constitutional changes. The study will focus on the period between 2018 and 2020.  
1.1.1 Why land reform was chosen as a topic to research elite consensus 
The land question in South Africa dates back to 107 years ago when the 1913 Natives Land Act was 
introduced. This started the process of forcefully dispossessing black families from their land. Black 
people were not allowed to buy or occupy land. This continued for decades. Once the apartheid 
government came into power in 1948, the regime began mass relocation of black families to poorly 
planned homelands and townships. Black people were unable to provide for their families and were 
forced to look for employment far away from their homes. The main consequence of this was the start 
of socio-economic challenges such as inequality, landlessness and poverty.  
Post-apartheid South Africa still faces a variety of challenges that stem from injustices originated 
from apartheid, landlessness being one of these issues. The majority of the South African population 
still does not own land, nor do they have access to land. One of the first challenges the democratic 
government faced “was how to address the unequal distribution of land in the country (Kloppers and 
Pienaar, 2014: 677). Constitutional obligations were made by the democratic government to institute 
comprehensive land reform programs – a program that consisted of land redistribution, restitution 
and land tenure. The aim of this program was to redistribute 30% of white-owned agricultural land to 
black South Africans by 2014. However, less than 10% of this land has been redistributed. Moreover, 
over 90% of the land that has been redistributed is not being used productively (Kloppers and Pienaar, 
2014: 678). This situation has contributed to an increase in poverty levels among land reform 
beneficiaries. This has forced landless South Africans to occupy land illegally.  
Inequalities are defined by race and are conceptualised into the capitalist economy of South Africa. 
Socio-economic inequalities are based on gender, class and race. Thus, the unequal redistribution of 
land and insecure land rights were cultivated. The nature of land reform in the country is intrinsically 
complex. Land reform was agreed to after difficult negotiation processes. Land reform failures 
contributed to citizens believing that land reform programmes were in trouble. Moreover, many 
citizens have the perception that land reform is politically misguided (Cousins, 2016: 12). Land 
signifies ‘home’. The dispossession of land “serves as a powerful symbol of generalised oppression 
and carries a profound political charge” (Cousins, 2016: 12). Political parties in South Africa has 
invoked the land question as an attempt to gain supporters. According to Cousins, “political rhetoric 
draws on a narrative in which white farmers and foreigners are the villains, black South Africans are 




The African National Congress (ANC) is being challenged by the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 
and the Democratic Alliance (DA) on which course is best suited for effective and efficient land 
reform in South Africa. The call for the expropriation of land without compensation has been acquired 
with varied emotions by citizens, political parties and other interest groups. While all political parties 
are in agreement that land reform is important, there is little consensus on how and which land reform 
programs should be implemented. The most basic assumption is that when political elites are in 
agreement on what constitutes the most fundamental and most important functions of a policy, the 
function will not be undermined (Bachrach, 1962: 443).     
Considering the above challenges with regards to land expropriation as well as the ripple effects it 
has on the economic inequalities in the country, this study will contribute towards highlighting the 
differences and similarities in political elites policies, ideas and ideologies around land expropriation 
and in doing so could map a way forward for political parties to come to a consensus in terms of 
focusing on their similarities and working towards a land expropriation program that could accelerate 
the redistribution of land in the country. 
1.2 Problem statement 
Land reform is a broad societal challenge. Section 25 of the Constitution outlines the law on property 
rights and land, “prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of property”, “limiting expropriation to cases 
directly associated to public interest for which individuals would receive just and equitable 
compensation” (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). However, since the 
establishment of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), “hard-left black-nationalists” have called for 
this section of the Constitution to be amended (The Economist, 2019). The ANC opposed 
amendments being made to the Constitution; however, fearing the “EFF was eroding its base of black 
voters, the party is now committed to amending section 25” (The Economist, 2019).  
Any “debates on land reform in South Africa reckon with the unequal legacy of white rule” (The 
Economist, 2019). Before Dutch settlers arrived in South Africa in 1652, there had already been wars 
of conquest over land by the indigenous people; however, “white rule has changed the nature of 
conflicts over land” (The Economist, 2019). Under apartheid, the majority of black citizens were 
forcefully removed from their land and isolated into homelands. Apartheid deprived black South 
Africans of the right to own land outside the homelands. Moreover, during apartheid, most black 
citizens did not have land titles, which means they could not sell their property or borrow against their 
property; “land reform in South Africa is a comprehensible reflection of the continuing inequalities 




South Africa has not been able to reinstate land rights to those who were previously disadvantaged 
by apartheid legislation. Of the 77.51 “million hectares of land owned by the state, only 8.67 million 
hectares or 1.2 percent has been allocated to beneficiaries” since 1994 (Kirsten and Vink, 2019). The 
underlying premise of this thesis is that without consensual unity among political elites, land reform 
will be hindered. A lack of consensual unity over the fundamental issues regarding land reform in the 
context of a constitutional democracy may prove problematic for furthering democratic consolidation. 
Agreement over key democratic norms among the political elite is central to deepening democratic 
consolidation. Elite consensus is based on the “rock of self-interest; self-interest is the privileged and 
the influential in the continuation of the political system of which their privileges rest” (Bachrach, 
1962: 442). The most basic assumption is that when political elites are in agreement on what 
constitutes the most fundamental and most important functions of the political system, consolidation 
will not be undermined (Bachrach, 1962: 443).  Political elites only need to take into account the path 
travelled by Zimbabwe to understand the impact poor decision-making and implementation of land 
reform programmes can have on society (Swart, 2010: 2). In the Zimbabwean case, this has led to 
comprehensive economic and social unrest “and in many ways has created a failed democratic 
project” (Swart, 2010: 3). Therefore, it is important that political elites reach a consensus on land 
reform issues.  
Land reform also has social, political, historical and economic importance in the country due to the 
injustices of unequal distribution of land during apartheid. Land reform programmes are significant 
to aspects of South Africa’s democracy because they are part of the transformation initiative and 
provide an appropriate example of how the rule of law finds expression. Moreover, land reform also 
captures essential aspects of citizen rights, particularly the right to own private property and what 
political elites think are the most viable ways to address the injustices of unequal land distribution. 
These aspects make land reform an appropriate case study for examining the main research question 
of this thesis.  
1.3 Theoretical perspectives 
1.3.1 Political elites and elite theory 
Political elites determine institutional arrangements, power structures and governance. Putnam (1971: 
651), loosely defines the political elite as those who are ranked at the top of the involvement, 
dimensions of interest and the influence they have in politics within a given society. The political 
elite can be “described as individuals with the power to make decisions that directly affect the policy” 
process and the political environment (Putnam, 1971: 652). Political elites are “powerful players who, 




political power” (Blondel and Muller-Rommel, 2007: 820). Higley (2006) describes “elites as persons 
who, by virtue of their positions in important organisations, can affect political outcomes” 
substantially and regularly. In other words, they are a small part of the population with the capacity 
to influence political outcomes. Political elites play an essential role in setting the policy agenda as 
well as deciding which policy issues should receive priority in relation to others.  
Despite the limited size of the political elite, they hold considerable power while the masses are 
submissive to them. This hypothesis forms the basis of elite theory (Higley, 2006: 15). Elite theory 
acknowledges that the individuals who hold power monopolise their power and make important 
decisions on policy issues for the masses (Higley, 2006: 15). Kifordu (2011), using the critical elite 
theory explains that if the political elite in a country have the power to make changes that directly 
affect political discourse, then the direction of that change is likely to be dependent on these few 
individuals. In relation to this theory, Rustow (1970: 32), stressed the importance of consensus among 
political elites as the foundation of democracy. Moreover, Rustow explains that democracy is best 
stabilised and maintained when consensus exists among the elites. The consensus could be in the 
form of common beliefs, the willingness to compromise or in the fundamentals of the rules of the 
game (Akinbode, 2017: 1). 
By studying the values of political elites, one assumes that attitudes towards the political system 
matter. In a democracy, governance is about solving pressing issues, such as land reform, that society 
is faced with. By learning how to solve these issues, the political elite gain significant authority and 
power to adjudicate disagreements, “coordinate collective action and even structure the private and” 
public sectors in society (Stohler, 2010: 1257). Elite communication across political parties/political 
networks is greatly encouraged because dependency on common ideologies provides an efficient and 
powerful way of understanding the complexities of the political world, as well as problem solving. 
Moreover, if elite consensus exists among political elites on supporting democratic values and public 
policy solutions, these democratic values and policy solutions are more likely to be transferred and 
embedded into the political system (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2007: 66). 
1.3.2 Conceptualising elite consensus 
Elite consensus plays an important role in the development of a country. Political elites have the 
power to influence democratic transformations and transitions and also have the ability to cause 
democratic breakdowns if they remain disunified on the rules of the game and policy decisions in a 
democracy. While it is important that political elites remain consensually unified, competition 
between these elites is essential. Elites compete to gain power and this ensures that more than one 




Generally, the solidarity among elite theory scholars is that agreement among political elites is 
important for the socio-economic development of a country. Through collective decision-making, 
political elites are capable of influencing various sectors in society, thus playing a substantial role in 
development. Therefore, building consensus among political elites is a necessary base for national 
development and growth. Akinbode (2017: 3) explained that factors such as race, religion, ethnicity 
and background diversity among elites may hinder building consensus on policy issues because policy 
issues are often examined through the prism of those factors. Given that political elites often have 
different affiliations with different political parties, homogeneity of ideologies among these political 
elites is often inadequate (Akinbode, 2017: 3).  
Democratic transitions and transformations are a product of political elite choices (O’Donnel and 
Schmitter, 1986). Higley and Burton (1989: 17) argue that stable democratic regimes are “heavily 
dependent on the consensual unity of political elites”. If the political elite are more politically active 
and more involved, it betters the chance of them coming to a shared consensus of the norms of 
democratic values in a country. However, no scholar has taken the position that consensus among 
political elites is absolute.  
Sniderman et al (1991: 349) claims that the important “contrast is not between the masses and political 
elites, but rather between groups of political elites that are in competition for political power”.  The 
main driver “of democratic politics is competition between political elites”. Political parties often 
disunite on issues of civil liberties in order to gain political advantage, out of difference political 
stances (Sniderman, 1991: 350). However, political elites cannot disunite to the point where they 
cannot come to an agreement on solutions to pressing policy issues. It is evident that it becomes more 
difficult to reach a consensus when more political elites are included in the process (Diamond, 1999: 
173). If political elites disunite to the point where they cannot agree on a policy solution, the entire 
policy process will be hindered. 
Reaching a consensus among political elites is a complex phenomenon. In most cases, outcomes of 
policy issues are associated with systematic incentives related to participation in formal alliances 
(Kreps, 2010: 201). Political elites often weigh the benefits and costs of joining alliances by exploring 
historical benefits and the probability of returns in the future as well as the costs that may arise (Kreps, 
2010: 202). Elite consensus is facilitated when all political elites participate in policy processes and 
decision-making (Diamond, 1999: 174). Without proper participation among political elites on policy 
solution alternatives, implementation may become problematic (Diamond, 1999: 175). Moreover, it 
is important to include the masses in the process in order to prevent political threats in the form of a 
referendum on which the masses can vote and overthrow decisions made by the political elite 




1.3.3 Importance of elite consensus 
Elite consensus has been shown to be important to the democratic consolidation of a country because 
it offers the necessary legitimacy to opposing actors to reach towards a unity, and more importantly, 
a stable democracy needs democratic political culture among the masses that also extends 
simultaneously as the political elite starts their processes of inclusion (Diamond, 1994: 173; Higley 
and Gunther, 1992: 11). Benavides (2011: 19) argues that the consolidation of democracies depends 
on elite settlements and is “shaped by the behaviour and attitudes of the political elite”, rather than 
on the democratic preferences of society which has been the general view of many scholars of 
“political culture in developed countries”. However, it is important to mention that it becomes more 
difficult to reach a consensus when more political elites are included in the decision-making process 
(Diamond, 1994: 173). According to Sniderman, Fletcher, Russel, Tetlock and Gaines, the “engine 
of modern democratic politics is competition between elites that has been characteristically organised 
around the electoral system” (1991: 349).  
Political elites must respect their oppositions’ viewpoints and the “rules of the democratic game” 
(Herson, 1975: 1012). In accordance with the political socialisation of political elites, the involvement 
of political elites in politics requires debates, negotiations, discussions, give and take and 
compromise. These factors are inherently important to democratic governance (Herson, 1975: 1013). 
The actual participation of political elites in politics should encourage respect of alternative 
viewpoints and political tolerance. However, participation will not always make political elites more 
tolerant. It could even make political elites less tolerant (Shamir, 1991: 1022).  
Scholars have suggested that democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns are a product of elite 
choices (O’Donnel and Schmitter, 1986). A disunified political elite, “which is the most common 
type”, produces unstable democratic regimes. A consensually unified political elite, “which is rarer, 
produces stable” regimes that could advance into a modern democratic regime, as in Britain or 
Sweden. Higley and Burton (1989: 17) argue that “stable democratic regimes” are “heavily dependent 
on the consensual unity of political elites”. If political “elites remain disunified, political regimes are” 
considered unstable, a notion that makes democratic transitions and breakdowns merely a “temporary 
oscillation in the forms that unstable regimes take” (Higley and Burton, 1989: 17). This leads to the 
premise that in order to transition to a stable democracy, political elites must transform from disunity 
to consensually unified.  
Democratic consolidation or democratic breakdown is dependent on how the attitudes, beliefs and 
values of political elites, as well as their interactions with one another, may affect the performance of 




policy in post-apartheid South Africa is related to the issue of land reform. Since the transition to 
democracy, growth has been slow and among the greatest barriers to growth is severe inequality (Agri 
News, 2018). Access to and ownership of land is one area where this disparity is most devastating. 
The World Bank has stated that the historically highly skewed distribution of land is one of the root 
causes of inequality in South Africa. Land reform is necessary in South Africa (Agri News, 2018). 
However, this is the only issue regarding land reform that there seems to be consensus on.  
1.3.4 Land reform 
Land inequalities are a “direct consequence of the racially discriminatory legislation that had been 
implemented” by the apartheid government (Bosman, 2007: 3). This legislation prevented the black 
population from owning land outside the native land reserves. The rest of the land was only made 
available to the white population (Leon, 2001: 12). In 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) 
came into power and had the responsibility to address these imbalances and injustices. However, there 
have been many implementation hurdles that have hindered the progress of land reform in the country. 
Besides cost and availability, other factors such as land acquisition, lodging of claims, land use 
planning, land distribution, resettlement programmes and infrastructure have all contributed to the 
broad spectrum of land reform and each of them has its own complexities (Vermeulen, 2009: 2).  
Elite consensus on the principles that govern land reform and approaches to land reform rest on a 
“consensus that is grown out of compromise of previous compromises between opposing interest 
groups” (Gulbrandsen and Engelstand, 2005: 900). The transition to democracy as well as land reform 
in South Africa has been brought about by a “series of compromises connected to the establishment 
of democratic governance” (Gulbrandsen and Engelstand, 2005: 900). Compromises between 
political elites can be found in various spheres within the public and private spheres; for instance, 
foreign policy, the relationships between public and the private, and gender relations. In societies that 
that undergo continuous change, the actions of top political elites have a direct effect on governmental 
operations and institutions (Gulbrandsen and Engelstand, 2005: 900). Political elites must develop 
responsibility for the political system. The importance of elite attitudes to the continuance and 
development of land reform in South Africa is dependent on their ability to co-operate and 
compromise. If political elites attempt to develop or change land reform programmes independently, 







1.4 Research objectives and research question 
The objective of this research is to establish whether there is sufficient elite consensus on the issue of 
land reform policy in order to advance policy.    
The research is guided by one overarching research question:  
Is there elite consensus on the land debate in South Africa among the three largest political parties?   
Two sets of indicators and their related secondary questions examine where there is sufficient elite 
consensus across the three largest political parties on land reform policy.   
1. Indicator One: Procedural and institutional consensus: Is there evidence of a shared 
understanding and tacit consensus about rules of the game and codes of political conduct with 
regards to land reform policy? 
a. Do elites accept one another as legitimate participants in the political process? 
b. Do elites accept the political institutions they frequent (Parliament) as legitimate? 
c. Do elites accept the legitimacy of the Constitutional order? 
2. Indicator Two: Consensus on core values and agreement over vital policy matters: Is there 
evidence of shared core values relating to land reform and related policy outcomes?   
a. Do elites share consensus on core values underpinning land reform? 
b. Do elites equally regard land reform as a vital policy?  
c. Do they share a common vision on the policy of land reform? 
1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1 Research design 
The research design of this research is a case study. This case study is focused on opinions and values 
of the political elite across the ANC, the DA and the EFF on land reform in South Africa. Yin, (2002: 
13) defines a case study as a “contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when 
the boundaries between a phenomenon and context are not clear and the researcher has little control 
over the phenomenon and context”. Case study research involves qualitative methods and is adequate 
for evaluating, comparing, understanding and describing different factors of research problems 
(McCombes, 2020). A case study is a suitable research design for gaining “concrete knowledge about 
a specific subject” (McCombes, 2020). It allows the researcher “to explore key characteristics”, 
implications and meanings of the case (McCombes, 2020).  




The study draws on the theoretical literature on elite consensus to develop a set of indirect 
indicators to obtain evidence of the existence of ‘elite consensus’ or otherwise among South 
Africa’s political elites on the issue of land reform. Thus, the key concept in this study, elite 
consensus, is rendered measurable by developing a number of indirect indicators. The different 
indicators set out below will therefore be used to identify evidence of the key concept:  
Procedural and institutional consensus: Evidence of a shared understanding and tacit consensus 
about rules of the game and codes of political conduct; 
Consensus on core values and agreement over vital policy matters: Evidence of a shared core values 
relating to land reform and related policy outcomes   
1.5.3 Data collection  
The research will primarily be guided by secondary resources through a desktop study. The research 
uses government publications (white papers and legislative acts), speeches, policy documents, party 
manifestos, newspaper articles, academic journal articles, committee meeting minutes and 
parliamentary meetings.  
The themes that will be examined include:  
- The issue of the expropriation of land; 
- The issue of whether or not compensation should be paid for land that is expropriated; 
- The issue of whether or not the Constitution should be amended to allow for the expropriation 
of land without compensation.  
1.5.4 Methodology 
The qualitative research approach was chosen as the methodology because this approach strengthens 
the interpretation and understanding of the elite consensual unity and its impact on the land question 
in South Africa. Qualitative research looks at the bigger picture and starts with a search for 
understanding and analysing the entire entity being researched. Qualitative research is deemed 
suitable for this study because the main purpose of this study is to explore the views, attitudes, 
behaviour and opinions among the political elites across the ANC, the DA and the EFF. The findings 
will provide an analytical description of the similarities and differences in opinions and values of the 
South African elite regarding land reform in the country. This research will conclude by determining 
whether there is an adequate consensus among the political elite on land reform policies and 
programmes to make meaningful progress in the future.   




Chapter 2: Literature review  
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of who the political elite are and the role they play in the 
political environment; conceptualise elite consensus and its importance to democratic consolidation.  
Chapter 3: Historical overview of land reform in South Africa.  
This chapter will contain a discussion on the history of dispossession and land reform since the 
transition to democracy.  
Chapter 4: Methodology 
This chapter outlines the research methods. Moreover, it explains the research design, data collection 
and techniques used to analyse the data in this study. 
Chapter 5: Analysis 
This chapter will contain an evaluation of the different values and opinions of land reform across the 
three dominant political parties in South Africa. The chapter will use a topic/thematically analysis. 
Each political party will be analysed separately.  
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This chapter will contain a comparison of the similarities and differences in opinions, values, and 
policies. Following that, the chapter will provide an overview of the results and findings of the 





Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the theoretical setting, to lay the foundation for the 
rest of the study. The aim is to connect political culture, political elites, and elite consensual unity to 
land reform and transformation in South Africa. The first objective of the chapter is to explain the 
concept of ‘political elites’ and their role in the political system. The chapter will then conceptualise 
‘elite consensus’, its importance for democratic consolidation and how theorists conceptualise its 
existence.  
2.2 Political culture 
Political culture can be described as the “set of sentiments, beliefs and attitudes that give meaning to 
the political process within a country and which provide the fundamental rules and assumptions that 
govern political behaviour in the political” system (Swedlow, 2013: 626). According to Almond and 
Verba (1963: 29), political culture offers a powerful approach to the day-to-day political events that 
take place within a political system by examining the underlying psychological influences that 
essentially shape most of everyday life. Political culture describes the way in which citizens are 
positioned towards the fundamental principles of their political system (Almond and Verba, 1963: 
29). In other words, political culture can be defined as the overall distribution of citizens’ orientations 
towards the political system, i.e. their attitudes, feelings, behaviours and thoughts towards the 
political system (Almond and Verba, 1963, 30). Each “political system is embedded in a particular 
set of orientations to political operations” and this set of orientations is referred to as political culture 
(Almond and Verba, 1963: 30).  
Political culture is the outcome of a “collective history” of the masses and political actors within the 
political system; rooted in their interests, behaviours and values (Almond and Verba, 1963: 398). 
Political culture consists of an elite subculture and a mass subculture. Almond and Verba (1963: 398) 
found that the values and actions of the political elite – elected representatives, political leaders – 
shape the political culture of the masses and have an impact on the approaches to governance and the 
ways in which the masses respond to the outcomes of governance (Welch, 2013: 4). In other words, 
the “political culture of the key political actors has a great impact on the political system and the 
processes of governance” (Elazar, 1972: 25). Baba (2015:117) argues that political culture is the main 
driver behind the political elite’s approaches to governance. Governance is “strongly influenced by 
the values that have been attached to governance” processes and the political elite's understanding of 




nature of the relationship between” the political culture and the political system’s performance, we 
are able to determine which political changes may occur (Kavanagh, 1972: 13). This is especially 
important to political scientists that are trying to identify conditions for a stable democracy 
(Kavanagh, 1972: 13). Therefore, understanding the political culture of political elites enhances 
political scientists’ abilities to describe the interactions between the political system and its culture 
(Elazar, 1972: 25).  
2.3 Elite political culture 
2.3.1 Conceptualising political elites 
Political elites are “institutionally distinct” and “politically diverse” groups of leaders (Gulbrandsen 
and Engelstad, 2005: 899). Putnam (1976: 651), loosely defines the political elite as those who are 
ranked at the top of the involvement, dimensions of interest and the influence they have in politics 
within a given society. The term relates only to those who rule hold political power. Political elites 
have the authority to guide and direct the regime, even if the main objective of the regime is to have 
all “its members play an active role in the decision-making process” (Blondel and Muller-Rommel, 
2007: 820). Furthermore, it has been argued that political elites should be autonomous in exercising 
political power. The notion of elites put forward by Gaetano Mosca claims that all societies are 
“divided into two groups”; namely, a minority who rules and masses that are ruled (Mosca, 1939: 
50). The organisational foundation of any elite group is the basis upon which political elites have the 
capacity to rule (Mosca, 1939: 52). Pareto focuses closely on government institutions as the centre of 
elite influence and power. Thus, political elites are directly linked to the instruments and environment 
through which political power functions and are seen as active rather than passive actors within it 
(Pareto, 1935). In other words, the legitimate relationship political elites have to government 
institutions enables their political power, “within constitutional and institutional constraints, to make 
the most important political decisions” (Francis, 2011: 11).   
Robert Dahl (1961) was the first political scientist to link political power to questions of political 
participation and legitimacy. Political elites are separated into leaders and sub-leaders. Sub-leaders 
are specialised experts who organise the day-to-day activities of governments. All recruitments are 
open to any individual that is well-educated, has prestige, an income or an occupation, may belong to 
the political elite. Therefore, the political elite in contemporary societies is composed of different 
groups of individuals from diverse socio-demographic backgrounds and professional positions. 
“Majority of these individuals are highly specialised and politically influential in single policy 




The characteristics of the political elite vary remarkably from one political system to the next. 
However, there are two characteristics all political elites share. First, the “social composition” of the 
political elite is significantly smaller than the masses in numbers. Secondly, the political elite are 
considerably more powerful than the masses. Furthermore, there are four distinct ways in which 
political elites differ tremendously from one another. The first distinction is between political elites 
and other elites. The political elite are usually distinct from the socio-economic elites (Blondel and 
Muller-Rommel, 2007: 824). 
Secondly, there are differences within the political elites. In political systems where the political elite 
are established around one political party, the political elite are usually unified. In communist 
countries such as the former Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, the political party is in control and the 
leader of that party appoints members of government, members of parliament and members of key 
positions for local and regional levels of government (Steen, 1997: 34). This is the case in single-
party systems and military regimes. In democratic regimes, a pluralistic party system exists where 
each political party is autonomous from the other. Here, political elites are divided horizontally. 
Vertically, differentiation occurs at three segments: 1) the party and party elites; 2) members of 
parliament, and 3) the government (Steen, 1997: 34). This differentiation exists even though parties, 
governments and legislatures are naturally linked together (Steen, 1997: 34). Thirdly, there are 
different patterns of recruitment. In democratic regimes, there is consistently freedom and, in some 
cases, full autonomy in recruiting political elites. Additionally, the power to recruit members of the 
political elite may be transferred to levels below central government, while this is not the case in 
authoritarian regimes (Laurentiu, 2004).  
The attitudes, beliefs and values of political elites are not merely based on a wide range of expertise 
and information but are “highly structured ideologies” that are tied to a continuous commitment to 
democracy and democratic principles (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2009: 65). Peffley and 
Rohrschneider argued that “political elites are the carriers of the democratic creed, who protect the 
democratic order from an unsophisticated and often undemocratic public” (2009: 65). Elite 
communication is considerably facilitated because dependence on a common ideology makes 
provision for an efficient and powerful heuristic for making sense of the political environment. 
Political elite “discourse helps structure political” debates so that the masses can adopt elite ideas of 
“what goes on with what”, even if they do not know why it is happening (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 
2009: 66). Moreover, if a consensus exists among political elites about democratic values and 
practices, these values and practices are likely to be transferred to the masses, or at least those who 




Political elites are politically diverse groups of leaders. This means governments and political parties 
are unique in terms of their political beliefs, religions, socio-economic status and gender. The 
characteristics of each political elite vary from individual to individual, as well as in accordance to 
the political party each individual has affiliated themselves with. Political elites within one political 
party are usually unified in their ideological (values) issues around specific policy issues. However, 
political elites from different political parties may not have unified ideological values. For instance, 
in the South African context, the political elites within the EFF agree that land should be expropriated 
without compensation. The DA disagree with this stance and argues that the expropriation of land 
without compensation would be an unconstitutional act. However, both political parties are tied to a 
continuous commitment to the South African democracy and democratic principles. While they have 
different ideological stances on the land question, all political elites are unified in upholding South 
Africa’s democracy because none of these political elites have challenged the political democracy as 
it stands. Political elites form an essential part of this study.  
2.3.2 Conceptualising elite political culture 
Elite political culture can be characterised as the patterns of behaviour, values and mindsets of those 
who directly affect “political outcomes” within a country (Seiyefa, 2017: 106). Elite political culture 
thus refers to the values, attitudes and opinions political elites hold about their political system. 
Scholarly work on elite political culture attempts to explain how the values, attitudes and opinions of 
these elites translate into political behaviour. Woshinsky (1995: 19) declared that elite political 
culture is the predispositions political elites (i.e. political leaders, elected representatives) have about 
the political system, how it works, and day-to-day principles and commitments to which they adhere. 
Thus, “the foundation of elite political culture is the shared” values and opinions among political 
elites (Woshinsky, 1995: 19). 
What factors shape elite political culture? Most analyses would argue that the way in which elites 
have been socialised is an important source of their attitudes and beliefs (McClosky, 1964: 90). 
Political elites are exposed to the political environment and its operating procedures and develop 
values and behaviour that create the basis of the institutional framework. Additionally, political elites 
are disproportionately exposed to the standards of a regime and embody regime norms rather than the 
masses (McClosky, 1964: 90, Putnum, 1976: 4). Moreover, political elites are “strategic actors” 
(Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2009: 67). They take into account the short-term performance of the 
regime and the personal benefits they could acquire from certain political institutions. Therefore, it is 




“short-term self-interest that should predict their political belief systems” and whether or not they 
will act as protectors of the democratic creed (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2009: 67).  
The behaviour of the political elite influence and shape broader political culture and mass citizen 
responses to politics (Seiyefa, 2017: 107). Inglehart argues that “cultural values depend on different 
value systems” that have been developed by the various political elites involved in the political system 
(Inglehart, 2000: 271). Furthermore, Camp (2001: 12) claims that “the values of the political elite in 
relation to governance and authoritative power are translated into mass views of state power and their 
assessments of the political elites’ performance” in government. However, various groups of elites 
can also hold quite distinct ideological opinions and values which can also, in turn, shape the political, 
social and economic landscape of a country (Woshinsky, 1995: 19).  
Elite political culture has a set of expectations and norms that are governed by formal codes of 
conduct and rules. According to Pye (1965: 7) political “elites will behave in a way that fulfils the 
expectations of the masses”, but will also act in a vigilant manner, calculating their behaviour on what 
they should do as representatives of the masses, and what may occur if they do not behave in a 
normative manner. Culture is deeply embedded in political structures, political systems and more 
specifically, political elites. In this regard, political culture is seen as normative because it guides how 
political elites should behave (Summerlee, 2011: 7).  
Elite political culture refers to how political elites behave, their ideological values and opinions about 
the political system. The basis of elite political culture is shared values among the political elites 
about the political system. One can argue that the basis of South Africa’s elite political culture that 
has been deeply embedded into the country’s political systems and structures is democracy. 
Democratic structures are the foundation of South Africa’s political system, how it works and the 
day-to-day principles to which the political elites adhere to. 
Elite political culture refers to how political elites behave, their ideological values and opinions about 
the political system. The basis of elite political culture is shared values among the political elites 
about the political system. One can argue that the basis of South Africa’s elite political culture that 
has been deeply embedded into the country’s political systems and structures is democracy. 
Democratic structures are the foundation of South Africa’s political system, how it works and the 
day-to-day principles to which the political elites adhere to.  
2.3.3 Elites and democratic consolidation 
Mutual consensus, compromise and accommodation between political elites are seen “as a 




2005: 899). Elite political culture influences the performance, functioning and structure of the most 
important “political institutions which, in turn, affect the process of democratic consolidation in a 
country” (Gulbrandsen and Engelstad, 2005: 899). Therefore, political elites play an important role 
in the maintenance and development (or breakdown) of a democracy.  
The likelihood that a country will reach democratic consolidation is dependent on the “beliefs, values 
and attitudes of political elites” who affect the performance of democratic political institutions 
(Benavides, 2011: 20). Benavides argued that the democratic consolidation of a country and the future 
of a country’s democracy are dependent on political elites and not the preferences of the masses in 
developing countries (2011: 17). Benavides claimed that “democratic consolidation is the dependent 
variable which will be a function of elite political culture (the independent variable)” (2011: 19). 
Therefore, the likelihood that a country will reach democratic consolidation depends on how the 
“values, attitudes and beliefs of political elites may affect the performance of the regime towards the 
institutional” composition that may reach the point of being a liberal democracy (Schedler, 1998: 2).  
The significance of political elites for consolidation is their ability to strike compromises to reach a 
consensus about how to preserve the democratic regime. Here, elite communication is greatly 
encouraged. There is a dependency on common ideologies that provide an efficient and powerful way 
of understanding the complexities of the policy process and the political system as a whole (Peffley 
and Rohrschneider, 2009: 66). “Elite discourse thus helps to structure political debates so that publics 
can adopt elite packages of ideas – to know “what goes with what” even if they do not know why” 
(Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2009: 66).  
Elite consensus has also been shown to be important to the democratic consolidation process in a 
country because it offers legitimacy to opposing actors to reach an agreement on what is best for the 
entire political system (Diamond, 1999: 173). It is clear that it becomes more difficult to reach a 
consensus when many political elites are involved in decision-making processes. However, no scholar 
has taken the position that elite consensus is absolute. On the contrary, there is acknowledgment of 
the unevenness of their support for democratic values and beliefs (Sniderman, Fletcher, Russel, 
Tetlock and Gaines, 1991: 350). The more politically involved political elites become, the more they 
share a consensus about various democratic norms and values, have a greater understanding of these 
norms and values and are more committed to embedding them into the political system (Sniderman, 
Fletcher, Russel, Tetlock and Gaines, 1991: 351). Elite consensus is part of a complex and continuous 





A “consensually unified elite” produces stable democratic regimes that could advance into modern 
democracies (Higley and Burton, 1989: 17). Thus, stable democratic regimes are “heavily dependent 
on the consensual unity of political elites (1989: 17). And as argued above, if elite consensus exists 
among political elites on supporting democratic values, policies and behaviours, these values are more 
likely to be transferred and embedded among the masses (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2009: 66). Elite 
consensus helps embed democratic values to the masses.  
Political elites hold political power, and because of this, have the ability to overthrow a democracy if 
their ideological values and opinions about the political system change. Therefore, elite political 
culture directly influences the functioning and performance of a political system. In turn, political 
elites have the responsibility to maintain and develop a democracy. If political elites do not share the 
same values about the rules of the game and codes of conduct of a democratic system, this could lead 
to a democratic breakdown. Reaching an elite consensus on democratic values has proved to be 
difficult. However, the more politically involved elites become in democratic processes, the more 
committed they become to upholding democratic values. In accordance to what is mentioned above, 
it can be argued that South African political elites can be considered consensually unified in terms of 
the democratic rules of the game stipulated in the Constitution as none of these political parties have 
attempted to challenge it.  If political elites in South Africa had made any attempt to challenge the 
democratic rules of the game, as they challenge one another during decision making and policy 
processes, these political elites would be considered disunified. This has the ability to lead to a 
democratic breakdown and cause the regression to an authoritarian regime. However, South African 
elites have proved to be committed to upholding the South African democracy.  
2.3.4 Detecting elite consensus in democratic societies 
It is clear from the literature review that there are no widely established measures or indicators for 
detecting ‘elite consensus’. Higley and Burton (1989: 18) lament the fact that the concept of 
“disunified and consensually unified national elites’ are poorly defined”. And only a few scholars 
have engaged in serious discussion about the measurement parameters of the concept. As Baylis asks 
(2012) “How much agreement does consensus require? Are there reliable empirical indicators for 
measuring elite consensus levels?” Nevertheless, a large body of work shows that scholars still 
attempt to establish whether elite consensus exists across vastly different country contexts. As such, 
we can draw on these case studies, based in the theoretical literature, to identify a common set of 
conceptual indicators for this case study to proceed to obtain accurate evidence in the South African 
case. Thus, this subsection reviews the theoretical and conceptual literature that guides the detection 




Consensually unified political elite members have a united organisational integration and value and 
belief consensus; no single political elite group dominates, and the majority of the political elite 
members have access to central decision-making processes. These elites may oppose one another on 
an ideological level but agree on the “rules of the game and have confidence in the legitimacy of the 
political institutions” (Higley and Gunther, 1992: 11). Elites that are ideologically unified are 
centralised in a dominant elite group; political elites do not manifest extensive disagreement because 
policies are constructed by the political leaders (Higley and Gunther, 1992: 11).  
Similarly, according to Higley and Burton (1989), elites are required to share a procedural “consensus 
and agreement on the rules of the game”. Consensus is not necessarily subject to shared fundamental 
values or policy goals. More specifically, they provide useful conceptual distinctions between the 
differences between consensually unified and disunified elites. They argue that elites can be 
considered consensually unified when its members: 
- Share a large consensus about rules and codes of political conduct amounting to ‘a restrained 
partisanship’, and  
- Participate in a more or less comprehensively integrated structure of interaction that provides 
them with relatively reliable and effective access to each other and to the most central 
decision-makers (Higley and Burton, 1989).  
This “combination of tacit consensus on the rules of the game and comprehensive integration” allows 
political elite members to view decision-making outcomes as a ‘positive sum’ rather than zero-sum 
or “politics as war” game (Higlely and Burton 1989: 19). With agreement on the rules of the game 
and decision-making access assured, diverse elite members accept the decisions made that they do 
not necessarily like because they know their voices will be heard in relation to other issues they 
consider important. For this reason, elites who have opposing ideologies and “policy positions refrain 
from pushing their own agenda” and differences to the point of violence.  
Thus, consensus is “the relative agreement among elites on the formal and informal rules and codes 
of political conduct and on the legitimacy of existing political institutions” (Higley and Gunther, 
1992: 10).  
There is also a general acceptance among political elites on the basic goals of public policy and the 
rules of the game (Herson and Hofstetter, 1975: 1010). It is a structure of agreements that constitutes 
the foundation of a regime’s legitimacy and political stability (Herson and Hofstetter, 1975: 1010).  
Political elites are considered consensually unified when most of its members share a consensus about 




in prejudice in favour of a certain cause for the regime (Higley and Burton, 1989: 19). Moreover, 
political elites can also be considered consensually unified when their members participate in a 
systematically integrated composition that provides effective and reliable access to one another; as 
well as central decision-making (Higley and Burton, 1989: 19). For instance, caucus meetings where 
members of respective political party members nominate candidates for office, elect delegates, 
stipulate party agreements and make policy decisions within the political party. In democratic 
countries, members of parliament from different political parties come together to exercise their 
individual and collective initiatives to advance their interests in oversight and the central decision-
making processes. It is important that political elites respect the opposition’s views. The involvement 
of political elites requires debates, negotiations, discussions and give and take compromises. These 
factors are essential to democratic governance (Herson and Hofstetter, 1975: 1012).  
With an agreement on the decision-making processes and the rules of the game, members of the 
political elite accept the decisions made in parliament, even if they do not necessarily agree with the 
decisions that have been made because it is what is best for the political system. The reason for this 
is because they might find success in pushing their own agenda on other pressing societal issues that 
are of interest to them. Political elites play an important role in the political system and have the 
capability to change political outcomes through their actions and opinions (Morgan, 2013: 4). It has 
been argued that once political elites are able to come to a consensus and integrate their orientations, 
other factions of governments will not occur, such as authoritarian regression (Prothro and Grigg, 
1960, 279; Higley and Burton, 1989: 19).  
Baylis (2012: 91) critiques Higley and Gunther’s argument and examines the issue of how much 
agreement elite consensus requires. Consensus suggests that there is a broad agreement among 
political elites, but how much agreement is needed among the political elites on policy issues? Baylis 
(2012) questions whether sufficient elite consensus is evident when elites share “a procedural 
consensus and agreement on the rules of the game” and not necessarily agreement on “substantive 
policy goals or fundamental values”. That consensus will be “mostly tacit”.  
Baylis critiques this evidential base of elite consensus. He argues that the extent to which procedural 
or institutional consensus (read: rules of the game) can be sustained in the absence of “agreement on 
substantive matters remains questionable”; elites experiencing “repeated defeats on what they see as 
vital policy matters or core values are unlikely to continue to acquiesce easily in the mechanisms that 
legitimated those defeats” (Baylis, 2012). He develops his argument further by pointing to the need 
to observe evidence of elite attitudes and behaviour towards each other and the institutions and 




A useful approach is to examine the attitudes of a range of actors towards fundamental 
political, social and economic institutions and towards one another. To what extent do 
rival elites accept the institutions as legitimate, or at least refrain from challenging them? 
To what extent do such elites accept one another as legitimate participants in the political 
process?  
He specifically points to the “level of disagreement among elites over the legitimacy of the political 
institutions” and the constitutional order in countries like Poland and Hungary (Baylis, 2012).  
He further argues that it is important that there is some agreement among political elites from various 
political parties on very discordant policy issues. The reason for this is that during parliamentary 
procedures, discussions are held on policy issues and a vote is taken. In order for a motion or an 
amendment to be implemented, there needs to be a majority vote (Baylis, 2012: 92). Most decisions 
that are made in parliament are based on the majority rule principle. It is required that more than half 
of the members of parliament who have casted their vote to agree in order to make a decision on the 
issues and solutions being voted on. 
Conversely, elites can be considered disunified when their members: 
- Share few or no understandings about the properties of political conduct, and  
- Engage in only limited and sporadic interactions across factional and sectoral boundaries 
(Higley and Burton, 1989: 20). 
In other words, disunified elites have “minimal integration – which is the inclusiveness of informal 
and formal networks of influence and communication among various political elite groups – and value 
consensus” (Morgan, 2013: 7). As a result, the legitimacy of existing political institutions is stunted 
and the struggle for political dominance is often violent. Political elites distrust each other when it 
comes to making policy decisions and this, in turn, makes the political environment unstable (Morgan, 
2013: 8). The main consequence of a disunified political elite is democratic instability.  
If political “elites remain disunified, political regimes” are considered unstable, a notion that makes 
democratic transitions and “breakdowns merely a temporary oscillation in the forms that unstable 
regimes take” (Higley and Burton, 1989: 17). 
There are no widely established measures or indicators for evaluating elite consensus. However, this 
study has drawn on Higley and Burton (1989) to guide the detection of indicators to establish the elite 
consensus among the South African elites. Higley and Burton (1989) have established that political 
elites are considered ‘consensually unified’ when they share a large consensus about rules of game 
and codes of conduct of a political system. Moreover, political elites are considered consensually 
unified if they participate in somewhat comprehensively integrated central decision-making. Majority 




South Africa’s political elites are ideologically unified as they share procedural consensus on the 
rules of the game and the South African democracy as a whole. These sentiments are all stated in 
each political parties’ manifesto, that their first obligation as political leaders are to uphold the values 
of the South African democracy (African National Congress, 2019; Democratic Alliance, 2019 and 
Economic Freedom Fighters, 2019). On account of this, one could argue that South African political 
elites are consensually unified as majority of the political elite have an understanding of the properties 
of political conduct and are comprehensively engaged in central decision-making.  
2.4 Elite Research in South Africa 
Kotze and Du Toit have examined “the extent to which the South African society conforms to the 
features of a divided society by reporting on a 1992 survey of the attitudes of elites” (1995: 28). The 
data Kotze and Du Toit have presented states how elites have viewed the civic structures that have 
“served as their own support bases and those of their opponents and how they view the major public 
institutions of the state and regime” (1995: 28). In the literature, it is argued that disunified elites 
make significant contributions to the failure/success of the process of democratization. Political elites 
play an important role in democratic transitions. Therefore, it has been agreed upon that a stable 
democracy is possible if there is a high degree of consensus among the political elite on the rules of 
the game (Kotze and Du Toit, 1995: 34).  
In South Africa, there is an overlap in the distribution of power among individuals and organisations 
(Kotze and Du Toit, 1995: 34). Individuals who possess influence and power occupy the “highest 
positions in the most important sectors of South Africa’s society” (Kotze and Du Toit, 1995: 36). 2, 
282 individuals were selected for the study. During the apartheid era, the apartheid regime was a 
divided society. A civil society had not been in place yet during the transition. Civic bodies were 
“strongly associated with partisan political formations that engaged with one another in conflicts of 
highly uncivil nature” (Kotze and Du Toit, 1995: 44). These divisions were caused by race, cultural 
attributes and language. However, since the transition to democracy, Kotze and Du Toit (1995: 46) 
concluded that in relation to the various attitudes analysed in their study, “there is a civil society in 
South Africa that serves as the common ground for democratic consensus among the elites on the 
rules of the democratic game. The consolidation of South Africa’s democracy required a shared 
foundation of “political loyalty” (Kotze and Du Toit, 1995: 46). Kotze and Du Toit found that new 
rulers of the South African democracy understand that the regime can be used to ensure consolidation 
occurs (1995: 46).  
It has been found that South African elites are willing to “extend their political rights to their political 




Du Toit, 2002: 176). Political tolerance is an importance phenomenon of democratic politics. Without 
political tolerance, regime legitimacy is jeopardized. Without political tolerance, political opponents 
are impeded from running for office. If no oppositions are allowed, authoritarian regimes may arise 
(Garcia-Rivero, Kotze and Du Toit, 2002: 171). However, those elites that are willing to advance 
their political rights to political opponents in South Africa, do not perceive governmental institutions 
as executing its operations correctly (Garcia-Rivero, Kotze and Du Toit, 2002: 176). 
It can be argued that South African elites understand the importance of political tolerance to uphold 
regime legitimacy and to allow free and fair elections, which is an important aspect of any democracy. 
Moreover, there is a common ground for consensus on the rules of the game and a shared foundation 
of “political loyalty” among elites. 
2.5 Conclusion  
Political elites are an essential part of this research topic. Political elite groups, i.e. political parties, 
each have a unique set of political beliefs on policy issues. For example, the EFF believes that all 
land should be state owned, while the ANC and DA do not agree with that view. However, the elite 
political culture of South African political elites, which refers to the ideological values and opinions 
political elites have towards the political system, are shared values about the South African 
democracy. Democratic structures and institutions are the basis the country’s political system. If 
political elites do not share the same values about the rules of the game and codes of conduct of a 
democratic system, these elites are considered disunified and this could lead a democratic breakdown. 
South African political elite seem to be committed to upholding the country’s democratic values. 
The above discussion forms the theoretical base for rendering the key concept in this study, elite 
consensus, measurable. Chapter 3 develops a number of indirect indicators which are then applied in 






Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology  
3.1 Introduction 
The following chapter provides an outline of the research methods that were followed in this thesis. 
The researcher explains the research design that was chosen for this study and why it was selected. 
Data collection instruments are described and the methods that were followed to complete this study 
are also included. Lastly, the researcher discusses the techniques used to analyse the data.  
3.2 Research design: Single case study 
The research design supports how the researcher has come to the research findings and conclusions 
(Sileyew, 2019). The research design is important because the researcher decides which research 
design is most appropriate in determining how information for the study will be obtained (Sileyew, 
2019). This study will make use of a single case study.  
Yin, (2002: 13) defines a case study as a “contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between a phenomenon and context are not clear and the researcher 
has little control over the phenomenon and context”. According to Yin, case study research is a 
legitimate method of research within the social science phenomena (2002: 13). The most central 
assumption about Yin’s definition is that other research strategies such as experiments and surveys 
are not capable of providing deep insight into a specific case that is of interest to the researcher (Yin, 
2002: 13). Therefore, what is needed is a “comprehensive research strategy”, namely: a case study 
(Yin, 2002: 14). Yin argues that a case study is an empirical investigation that inquires a case or cases 
by adhering to the definition above by addressing the “why” or “how” questions regarding the 
situation or fact that is at hand. Case study design is “particularly instrumental for program 
evaluations” (Yazan, 2015: 138). The rest of Yin’s definition draws awareness to data collection and 
analysis in accordance to the circumstances being examined: in order to analyse a distinct 
phenomenon that includes “more variables of interest than data points,” case studies draw from 
multiple lines of evidence for triangulating bases and assists itself by “prior development of 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2002: 14). Yin’s approach is 
conscientious in relation to consistency and cohesion among design phases and components of case 
study research. When making decisions during the “research process, researchers should be able to 
make provision for the logic behind it in adherence to the theoretical perspectives and the 




South Africa’s colonial and apartheid legacy has left the majority of the country’s citizens without 
the opportunity to own land. Land reform and the rule of law are complex phenomena that are set in 
a complex political system. These issues have a direct impact on the elite consensual unity within the 
country, as well as establishing a stable democratic regime. The outcome of this research is to promote 
further discussion on the need for elite consensus land reform initiatives in the South African region 
to promote a stable democratic regime. A case study approach was chosen for this research because 
case study research is an empirical inquiry that examines a “phenomenon within its real-life context” 
(Yin, 2002: 13). Land reform is a very real issue in South Africa. Moreover, case studies are based 
on critical analysis of an individual or group to investigate the “causes of underlying principles” (Yin, 
2002: 13). A case study approach will provide the means to describe, explain and analyse land reform 
and elite consensual unity in South Africa.   
The advantages of using case study include:  
- Provides comprehensive qualitative information;  
- Provides comprehension for further research on land reform and elite consensual unity in 
South Africa;  
- Case study research can be done remotely. Therefore, researchers do not need to be present at 
a specific facility to conduct research. This is especially important in relation to this study 
because Members of Parliament are not easily accessed. Desktop research provides sufficient 
information for empirical analysis.  
A case study research design provides a detailed study of a specific phenomenon, such as a group, 
organisation, event or place (Baxter and Jack, 2010: 546). Case studies are most commonly used in 
social science research. A case study research design has been used for this study because case studies 
are useful for understanding, comparing and evaluating various aspects of a research problem (Baxter 
and Jack, 2010: 547). The main focus of this thesis is to evaluate and compare the similarities and 
differences in ideological (values) issues among the political elites within the ANC, the DA and the 
EFF on land reform. Therefore, a case study research has allowed the researcher to explore the key 
characteristics and implications of this research problem (Baxter and Jack, 2010: 547). It has allowed 
for in-depth investigation of the topic at hand. A case study research design has proven to be 
comprehensive as it has provided space and time to build a detailed understanding of the topic. 
Moreover, as it has captured a range of perspectives from each political party. Therefore, it has 
reduced biases. It has given the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of each subject.   




The units of analysis are the primary entity being studied in a research project. The unit of analysis 
could be any of the following entities: groups, individuals, geographical units, artefacts and social 
interactions. According to Dolma “the unit of analysis can simply be defined as the entity being 
analysed in a scientific research paper” (2010: 169). Determining the unit of analysis has a 
fundamental role to play in the research process.  The unit of analysis in this study is elite consensual 
unity among political elites across the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance 
(DA), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) on the land question. The components that will be 
examined are: 1) the issue of expropriation, 2) the issue of compensation, and 3) constitutional 
amendments. In this study, in-depth text analysis is used to investigate this data on components 
mentioned above and to understand the conditions and impact elite consensual unity or lack thereof 
has on the future of land reform in South Africa, as well as democratic stability.  
3.4 Research methodology and data collection methods 
Research methodology is established by the nature of the research question and the primary entities 
being examined. Therefore, the research methodology used in any given research should be seen as a 
mechanism to answer the research question (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 3). According to Rajasekar, 
Philominathan and Chinnathambi, “research methodology is a systematic way to solve a problem 
(2013: 5). It is a way in which research is carried out. In other words, it is the course of action by 
which a researcher goes about predicting, describing and explaining a phenomena” (Rajasekar, 
Philominathan and Chinnathambi, 2013: 5). The main aim of research methodology is to “give the 
work plan of the research” (Rajasekar, Philominathan and Chinnathambi, 2013: 5).  
Qualitative research answers how, what and why “questions that require collection of qualitative 
rather than quantitative data” (Tavakol and Sanders, 2014: 748). Once the data has been collected, 
the researcher analyses the research questions that provide additional information on a specific theory. 
This kind of research does not need to include a hypothesis; it determines similarities and differences 
between the primary entities being studied and/or an explanation of the phenomenon (Tavakol and 
Sanders, 2014: 748). Analysing qualitative data includes attempting to understand and interpret the 
primary entities in a study (Hooper, 1992: 29). Analysing qualitative data is done by organising the 
data collected to increase the researchers understanding in order to present the findings (Hooper, 
1992: 29). The presentation of the findings refers to transcripts and notes as raw data that needs to be 
transformed into clarified data for better examination by the researcher (Hooper, 1992: 30).  
Qualitative research allows the researcher to develop and interpret a comprehensive picture of the 
phenomenon in question. Qualitative research requires research questions. Research questions 




relation between the researcher’s goals and the researcher’s theoretical frames. The theoretical frames 
consist of all the previous researches, findings or theories; existing on the topics to be studied that are 
mobilized by the researcher” (2018: 29). When using qualitative research methods, it is important 
that the researcher uses the fundamental principles of research design. For instance, it is important to 
link the research question to the theoretical framework and “methodological approaches, bearing in 
mind the problems of data collection and analysis” as coherent and being directly about the main 
focus of the research (Haradhan, 2018: 29).  
The qualitative research approach was chosen as the methodology for this study because this approach 
strengthens the interpretation and understanding of the elite consensual unity and its impact on the 
land question in South Africa. Qualitative research looks at the bigger picture and starts with a search 
for understanding and analysing the entire entity being researched. It focuses on understanding 
specific circumstances rather than making assumptions or predictions about the setting. Qualitative 
research is deemed suitable for this study because the main purpose of this study is to explore the 
views, attitudes, behaviour and opinions among the political elites across the ANC, the DA and the 
EFF. Secondary data was collected for analysis in an attempt to answer the research question. 
Secondary data allows the researcher to build on existing information, which guides better results. 
Secondary data collected for this study was obtained without fieldwork. Published reports, manifestos 
and policy documents were collected from each political party via their websites and is deemed 
sufficient for analysis and the answering of the research question Moreover, media statements, caucus 
meetings and parliamentary meetings were accessed via the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG). 
Published interviews and reports were collected from YouTube via the Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa, My Africa and other news channels. 
3.5 Data analysis 
The following section will explain how the data will be analysed, by referring to some of the main 
texts covered in the theoretical chapter of this thesis. Concepts are by definition abstract. And they 
are not directly observable. It is the task of a research design to translate a study’s key concepts into 
“indicators that can be detected and evidence that can be encountered in the real world” (Toshkov, 
2018: 227). Operationalisation is still necessary and relevant for research that eschews the language 
of variables and measurement, such as in-depth single case studies (this study). In this qualitative 
research mode, “it is more appropriate to think of operationalisation as linking concepts with pieces 
of empirical evidence that will be searched for, and collected in the process of research” (Toshkov, 
2018: 227). Thus, “in the process of research design, all concepts relevant to the project must be 




us, irrespective of whether the approach is qualitative or quantitative, the concept must be rendered 
measurable (Mouton 1996: 119). 
How do we ‘operationalise’ a concept for a qualitative study? The most common approach is to 
develop indirect measures for the theoretical concept under study (Mouton 1996: 119). Mouton 
(1996) suggests starting with a review of the existing literature. This provides researchers with not 
only theoretical formulations and definitions of key concepts, but importantly provides guidelines 
and suggestions on research design. In other words, a literature review acts as a methodological 
resource. Researchers draw from the theory the different design and methods used to study the key 
concept, and more specifically, the different indicators used to identify evidence of their key concept 
(elite consensus). Mouton reminds us that qualitative researchers link their theoretical components to 
the empirical world through the collection of behaviour specimens (Mouton, 1996: 130). In other 
words, they operationalise their concepts through a careful analysis of their evidence. In doing so, we 
link key concepts to actual phenomena.  
This study therefore turns to the established theoretical literature on elite consensus to develop a set 
of indirect indicators to obtain evidence of the existence of ‘elite consensus’ or otherwise among 
South Africa’s political elites on the issue of land reform. 
Higley and Burton (1989) argue that political elites are required to share procedural consensus and 
agreement on the rules of the game. Consensus is not necessarily subject to shared fundamental values 
or policy goals. According to Higley and Burton (1989) political elites can be considered consensually 
unified when their members:  
- Share a large consensus about rules and codes of political conduct amounting to ‘a restrained 
partisanship’, and  
- Participate in a more or less comprehensively integrated structure of interaction that provides 
them with relatively reliable and effective access to each other and to the most central decision 
makers. 
Elites can be considered disunified when their members:  
- Share few or no understandings about the properties of political conduct, and  
- Engage in only limited and sporadic interactions across factional and sectoral boundaries 
Baylis (2012) states that elite consensual unity is evident when elites share “a procedural consensus 
and agreement on the rules of the game” but not necessarily agreement on substantive policy goals 




defeats on what they see as vital policy matters or core values are unlikely to continue to acquiesce 
easily in the mechanisms that legitimated those defeats” (Baylis, 2012).  
The different indicators set out below will therefore be used to identify evidence of the key concept:  
1. Procedural and institutional consensus: evidence of a shared understanding and tacit 
consensus about rules of the game and codes of political conduct  
a. Do elites accept one another as legitimate participants in the political process? 
b. Do elites accept the political institutions they frequent (Parliament) as legitimate? 
c. Do elites accept the legitimacy of the Constitutional order? 
2. Consensus on core values and agreement over vital policy matters: evidence of a shared core 
values relating to land reform and related policy outcomes   
a. Do elites share consensus on core values underpinning land reform? 
b. Do elites equally regard land reform as a vital policy?  
c. Do they share a common vision on the policy of land reform? 
The researcher in this study analysed the media statements, reports, caucus meetings and policy 
documents of each political party separately. This was done to identify each party’s values, opinions 
and behaviours in relation to the land question in South Africa to determine whether South Africa’s 
elite can be considered consensually unified or disunified in relation to the indicators mentioned 
above. The components of land reform that were analysed were grouped in accordance to: 1) the issue 
of expropriation, 2) the issue of compensation and 3) constitutional amendments. First, the indicators 
were identified through reading and re-reading data notes, reflecting on what was read and organised 
into the patterns and themes of the study. Following that, once the data was collected, the researcher 
examined the data to identify the presence of procedural and institutional consensus and consensus 
on core values and agreement over vital policy matters. The presence of these indicators or lack 
thereof is represented in the documents collected for each respective political party.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the research design and methodology that is used in this thesis. A 
description of a single case study and qualitative research as a method for data collection and analysis 
was provided. Explanations of the indicators used in the study were also given. The following chapter 






Chapter 4: Historical Overview of Land Reform in South Africa 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will contain a discussion on the history of dispossession of land during colonialism and 
apartheid and land reform policies following the transition to democracy. The discussion on 
colonisation, apartheid policies and current land reform have been included to depict the importance 
of land reform in South Africa. Moreover, it provides an insight as to how land reform policies have 
been transformed from colonial times to contemporary South Africa.  
4.2 Colonisation  
Land dispossession started in 1652 in the Cape of the Khoekhoe land through to the implementation 
of the racially discriminatory policies under apartheid (Drimie, 2003: 39). The indigenous people 
during that time did not ascribe to the concept of ownership of private property. Therefore, the settlers 
did not regard these individuals as having private property rights. Thus, the rudimentary ‘transfer’ of 
land involved acquiring the land by force, with and without formal agreements to stipulate the new 
boundaries that were established along with settler control (Claassens, 1991: 45). The British initially 
occupied the Cape Colony from 1795 to 1803, , and for the second time from 1806.  
By the 1830s, the Boers had become dissatisfied with British colonialism which led to the Groot Trek. 
The Groot Trek was a migration of Dutch Settlers into and beyond the Cape Colony (Tong, 2003: 
12). The Groot Trek was a reaction to the land shortages that had spread to the north and eastern areas 
of the Cape Colony. They established themselves on land that was already occupied by Africans. 
Europeans inhabited much of the land and small reserves were created for Africans. Most Africans 
lived as labourers on farms owned by whites. During this time, laws and policies were implemented 
that placed severe limitations on the private property rights of the blacks. The Boer Republic and the 
Orange Free State made it illegal for blacks to own any land, apart from exceptional situations (Lee, 
2003: 6).  
4.3 Apartheid policies 
Apartheid legacy has left many citizens without the opportunity to own land. The Natives Land Act 
27 of 1913 made it illegal for Africans to take possession of land except what was allocated to them, 
was first implemented in 1913 (Claassens, 1991: 48). The main purpose of the Natives Land Act was 
to create territorial segregation between black and white citizens. A provision of the Glen Grey Act 
25 of 1894 was integrated into the Land Act that prohibited non-white citizens from owning or buying 




could own land. However, only 9.1 hectares of land was allocated and was not nearly sufficient for 
the scope of the non-white population (Vermeulen, 2009: 16). The same provisions were made for 
the homeland policies that were implemented in the fifties.  
Non-whites could not access or own land outside the areas that were reserved for them unless they 
were employed as “labourers on white farms” (De Beer, 2006: 26). Land that was originally assigned 
for black citizens was not enough. In an attempt to increase the size of the area the Natives Trust and 
Land Act 8 of 1936 located more land to be given to the reserves. The Native (Urban) Areas Act 21 
of 1923 and the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act 25 of 1945) established the basis for the “pass laws” system 
for non-whites in urban areas. Existing land occupation and ownership patterns were retained because 
these Acts excluded non-whites from owning any land outside the reserved areas (Tong, 2002: 53). 
The National Party (NP) came into power in 1948 with the promise of promoting racial segregation 
and a white supremacist regime. As Vermeulen states (2009: 18), racially discriminatory legislation 
was further implemented by the apartheid regime which created the extremely “skewed imbalances 
of economic prosperity and political power between white and black South Africans”. In 1950, the 
Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 was implemented.  
The Group Areas Act defined unequal and divided residential areas for whites, coloureds, Indians 
and blacks. The Group Areas Act was promulgated in July 1950 and was implemented over the time 
span of several years. Whites, who made up approximately 13 percent of the population  had access 
and owned 87 percent of the country’s land in comparison to the black population, who made up the 
majority of the population, who only had access to 13 percent of the land (Walker, 2007: 137). Each 
racial group’s political rights were limited to their reserved areas. The apartheid regime expropriated 
this land, with some compensation, known as ‘black spots’ and relocated these citizens to the 
homelands and reserves. By 1983, 247 black spot farms were forcefully removed and roughly 475 
000 people were relocated to the reserves (Walker, 2007: 137).  
The apartheid government implemented the Law on the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 
1951 and the Bantu Laws Amendment Act 42 of 1964 to eradicate illegal squatting and to transform 
labour tenants into wage labourers as many black families were still residing on white farms as tenants 
(De Beer, 2006: 27). These policies and laws confined blacks to reserves and homelands as they were 
restrained from moving around freely in the country. Approximately 3.5 million people were 
forcefully removed and relocated to reserves under the extensive legislation that was implemented 
(De Beer, 2006: 27).  




During the final years of apartheid, there was increased international pressure on the government to 
transition to a democratic state. Land was seen as a central problem to be addressed because of the 
consistent dispossession of blacks’ land and property rights while whites enjoyed political and 
economic privilege. The three main political parties that were involved in the negotiated transition to 
democracy included the African National Congress (ANC), the Liberal Party, the National Party (NP) 
and other non-governmental organisations concerned with the issue of land. Each political party 
promoted their own interests that they wanted integrated into the interim Constitution (Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993). Each political party had contrasting views and 
opinions of principles on land reform policies in the country. A consensus had to be reached.  
The ANC argued for the expropriation of land in 1992 and prioritised land restitution above land 
reform mechanisms (Lahiff, 2007: 1580). The World Bank assisted the ANC in formulating the land 
reform scheme. This is important to take into consideration because the “ANC entered the transition 
without an analysis of the agrarian questions of agricultural restructuring that would go hand in hand 
with land redistribution and its impact on agricultural production” (Vermeulen, 2009: 21). In the 
proposal released by the World Bank in 1993 during the negotiation stages was a “grant-driven 
programme for distribution” where the government would encourage small farmers to obtain land 
through the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ mechanism (Vermeulen, 2009: 21). The proposal 
stipulated that 30 percent of land should be transferred back to blacks within five years and would 
cost the government approximately R17.5 billion (Vermeulen, 2009: 21). A new aspect of land 
restitution was established when the interim Constitution acknowledged the right to have land 
transferred back to those it was taken from as a constitutional right (Vermeulen, 2009: 22). One of 
the main priorities for the NP was to protect property rights. The ANC considered this as an obstacle 
to land restitution. However, negotiations between the two parties came to a consensus that both land 
restitution and private property could be considered constitutional rights and that the one does not 
have to contradict the other (Vermeulen, 2009: 22).  
Land reform initiatives and programmes rest on a “consensus grown out of negotiations and 
compromises between opposing” political parties and non-governmental institutions. These 
compromises were established between the leaders of the various parties involved, interest groups 
and movements during the democratic transition (Gulbrandsen and Engelstad, 2005: 899). In this 
regard, and in “accordance with elite theories, these compromises were elite compromises” and pacts 
to reach a consensus on what was deemed best for the new democratic government in South Africa 
(Gulbrandsen and Engelstad, 2005: 899). The significance of political elites during this period was 
their ability to achieve compromises to reach a stable consensus on the issue of land and what would 




4.5 Land reform in democratic South Africa 
The final Constitution Act 108 of 1996, which is correctly referred to simply as the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 did not amend the underlying basis of land restitution and 
redistribution as stipulated in the interim Constitution. However, it extended the constitutional 
commitment to address the land issue (Walker, 2005: 816). Moreover, it forbids the “arbitrary 
deprivation of property”: the government is directly empowered to “expropriate land in the public 
interest”. This shows a more substantial land reform than was stipulated in the 1993 Constitution 
since the “nation’s commitment to land reform” is incorporated into the definition of “public interest” 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996).  
Protection of private property rights are provided for in section 25 (1) of the Constitution which 
stipulates that no individual can be deprived of their land, “except in terms of law of general 
application and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property” (Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996). However, in section 25 (8), it also stipulates that “no provision of this section 
may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related 
reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from 
the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provision of section 36 (1)” which states that 
“the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of the general law application to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society” (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996).  
In 1996, the ANC implemented the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Programme 
which included the “willing-buyer, willing-seller mechanism to address land reform” (Hall and 
Ntsebeza, 2007: 13). This mechanism is a market-led reform where land is bought from the owner 
(who is willing to sell their land) by the government (who is the willing buyer). Once the government 
(willing buyer) has bought the land from the owner (willing seller) the land would then be 
redistributed to the beneficiaries of land reform. This mechanism was implemented in order to 
maintain citizens’ confidence in land reform programmes; however, it “has proved to be difficult to 
implement” in South Africa (Hall, 2007: 103). In 1997, the White Paper on the South African Land 
Policy confirmed that the willing-buyer, willing -seller mechanism would be used to access land for 
redistribution to beneficiaries (Vermeulen, 2009: 24).  
This is the constitutional framework against which the government’s land reform programmes and 
policies have been formulated since the late 1990s. Though the transition to democracy can be 
considered a success story, the same cannot be said about land reform initiatives. The government 




democracy. As a result of the lack of progress made over land reform, there is increasing tension and 
disagreement among the political elites in the African National Congress (ANC), the Democratic 
Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) on how to address land-related policy 
issues and how to achieve the original reform targets.  
The lack of agreement on how to achieve land reform among political elites  could further hinder 
progress on land restitution and redistribution. Rosenbaum (1975: 27) has argued that a lack of 
agreement among political elites across different political parties could bring about tensions that are 
consequential for the political system. It is therefore important that South Africa’s elites reach a stable 
agreement  on the best way forward for land reform in South Africa. Less than 10% of white-owned 
land has been redistributed to land reform beneficiaries.  
4.6 Current legislation on land reform 
4.6.1 Constitutional framework 
The Constitution of South Africa provides the framework for land reform, expropriation and the 
protection of property rights if “it is in the public interest” (Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996). In order to redress the legacy of the dispossession of land during apartheid, the 
Constitution has included the following:  
- A community or person dispossessed of their property after June 1913 due to the racially 
discriminatory practices and laws that were implemented by the apartheid government is 
entitled to either equitable compensation or restitution of the property.  
- The government must ensure that legislative and other mechanisms are put in place, within its 
capacity, to ensure that beneficiaries of land reform have access to land on an equitable basis.  
- A community or person whose tenure of land is legally insecure due to past discriminatory 
laws is entitled to tenure that is legally secure or to comparable redress (The Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996).  
Additionally, the government has implemented various segments of legislation to redress past 
inequality of the ownership of land. To name a few; the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 makes 
provision for the administration and registration of land ownership; the Land Titles Adjustment Act 
2 of 1995, that regulates the allocation of land where one or more persons claim ownership, but do 
not have legally secure title deeds for the property; the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, 
that was enacted to address the challenges of unemployment, inequality and poverty. The Act makes 
provision for restitution of land to a person or community that was dispossessed of their land after 




tenure of labour tenants (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). The Expropriation Act 
63 of 1975, which provides the framework for the expropriation of property and land is most 
important to the study at hand.  
4.6.2 The Expropriation Act 
The Expropriation Act “provides for the expropriation of land and other property for public and 
certain other purposes; and to provide for matters connected therewith”. The main purpose of the Bill 
is to provide for the expropriation of land or property for the purpose of public interest or public 
purpose. Moreover, it provides for the compensation of just and equitable payment when land 
expropriation occurs.  
The Expropriation Act is reflected in section 25 of the Constitution which guarantees property rights 
to landowners. Section 25 (1) of the Constitution stipulates that “no one may be deprived of property 
except in terms of law of general application and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property” 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Moreover, section 25 (2) of the Constitution 
makes it especially clear that property will only be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public 
interest. Before the government expropriates property, the expropriating authorities must set out to 
come to an agreement with the owner on just and equitable terms. Therefore, land will not just be 
expropriated. Property may only be expropriated only in terms of law of general application 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Section 25 (3) states that compensation provided 
when property is expropriated must be “just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between 
public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances” which 
include: “a) current use of the property; b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; c) 
the market value of the property; d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition 
and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and e) the purpose of the expropriation” (The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
The circumstances under which land will be expropriated will have to be examined to decide how 
much compensation the state will pay. Compensation would vary depending on the circumstances 
examined. For instance, where property is not being used productively, or for property obtained 
during apartheid the government would pay the minimum compensation. Compensation varies 
drastically. One property may be expropriated for R1 000 while another may require that the 
government pay a much higher amount; based on the factors outlined above. A court will rule on any 
disputes between property owners and the expropriation authorities in relation to the compensation 
to be paid. In terms of “urgent expropriation”, the expropriating authorities have the right to use 




used during a disaster and the court has ordered “urgent expropriation” (Expropriation Act 63 of 
1975).  
4.6.3 White Paper on land policy  
The framework for land reform was set out by the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) in April 1997. 
The government’s “land reform programme aims to achieve objectives of equity in terms of access 
to land and the ownership of land and efficiency in terms of improved” utilisation of transferred land 
(Department of Land Affairs, 1997: 14). These objectives are described in the White Paper: “The 
purpose of the land redistribution programme is to provide the poor with access to land for residential 
and productive uses, in order to improve their income and quality of life. The programme aims to 
assist the poor, labour tenants, farm workers, women, as well as emergent farmers. Redistributive 
land reform will be largely based on willing-buyer, willing-seller arrangements. Government will 
assist in the purchase of land but will in general not be the buyer or owner” (Department of Land 
Affairs, 1997: 38).  
Land restitution, gives relief for certain groups of victims of land dispossession, was established to 
handle land claims and other land-related matters against the State, rather than against the previous 
or current owners. Provision is made for three wide-ranging categories of relief: restoring the land 
being claimed, granting alternative land to beneficiaries or payment of compensation. Restitution 
claims were submitted until 31 December 1998. 63 455 claims were lodged and the number of claims 
during the 2002 validation campaign were 79 687 (Ministry of Agricultural and Land Affairs, 2003: 
12). The Commission on Restitution of Land Rights was established to handle the backlog of claims 
on rural and “prime agricultural land” (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon and van den Brink, 2009: 
172). Until 2006, the government depended on “voluntary agreements with landowners to purchase 
privately owned land on behalf of the beneficiaries of land reform” (Binswanger-Mkhize, 
Bourguignon and van den Brink, 2009: 172). Moreover, substantial areas of state-owned land were 
restored. In 2003, an amendment was made to the Restitution Act stipulating that land could be 
expropriated by ministerial order. Expropriation orders began in January 2007. While there have been 
“success stories” in restitution, these have gone unmatched by the number of claims that have failed 
to produce benefits or merely collapsed (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon and van den Brink, 2009: 
173).  
Tenure reform refers to the strengthening and protection of individuals occupying privately owned 
land and State land (Department of Land Affairs, 1997: 15). This reform was established to ensure 
that the tenure rights of victims of past discrimination are secure. According to section 25 (6) of the 




racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, 
either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress”. This ensures that these people have 
legally enforced rights to land. Parliament passed a number of laws that provides security of tenure 
and addresses the needs of various categories of landowners (Rugege, 2004: 13). The “most 
significant ones are the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, which protects tenants and the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997”, that protects occupants of rural land with content 
from landowners (Rugege, 2004: 13).  
Land redistribution seeks to address the imbalance of land ownership on a more extensive scale. The 
legal framework of land redistribution is set out in the Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act 
126 of 1993 which was amended in 1998 and is now named the Provision of Land and Assistance 
Act 58 of 2008. Land redistribution policy is based on the performance of the existing land market. 
Other mechanisms include expropriation of land. Land redistribution was implemented to enhance 
the obligation of the State to increase accessibility to land (Regege, 2004: 8). Prior to 2000, land 
redistribution policy was based on the allocation of the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (a grant 
where R16 000 was allocated to households that had an income of less than R15 00 per month) 
(Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon and van den Brink, 2009: 176).     
4.6.4 National Development Plan 
The National Development Plan (NDP) is a document that specifies desired goals and the role each 
sector needs to play in acquiring those goals (South African Government, 2013). The NDP’s 2030 
goal for land reform is that rural communities have better opportunities to participate in political, 
political and social life. Successful infrastructure development, job creation, land reform and poverty 
alleviation can assist rural communities to be better integrated into the economy.  
The NDP identified six urgent policy imperatives for rural development and land reform, which are 
the focus for medium-term development to 2019:  
- “Enhanced land administration and spatial planning for further development in rural areas; 
- Agrarian amendment through sustainable land reform; 
- Enhanced food security; 
- Development of infrastructure, financial and technical support for smallholder farmers; 
- Greater access to quality primary infrastructure and services in rural areas, especially in 
education, healthcare and public transport; 
- An increase in sustainable rural enterprises and industries characterized by rural-urban 
linkages, increased investment in agri-processing, trade development and access to markets 




The NDP also states that land reform will unlock the prospective for an expanding, effective and 
employment-generating agricultural sector.  
4.7 Conclusion  
Indigenous South African’s have been dispossessed of their land since the 1600’s. Since then, laws 
and policies were implemented that have placed severe limitations on private property rights of black 
citizens. It was illegal for black citizens to own land the final years of apartheid. Land reform 
negotiations began due to increased international pressure on the apartheid government to transition 
to a democratic state. Land was seen as a central problem to be addressed because of the consistent 
dispossession of black citizens from their land. Each political party involved had their own contrasting 
views on the best way forward for land reform. However, consensus grew out of negotiations and 
compromises between opposing political parties. The importance of political elites during this period 
was their ability to achieve compromises, despite their contrasting ideological views, to reach the 
program to implement to address the land issue.  
Since these land reform initiatives were implemented, government has not made significant process 
in addressing the land issue. Consequently, of the lack of progress made over land reform, there is an 
increase in disagreement among the political elites on how to address these issues. This lack of 
agreement among the elites has further hindered progress on land reform. If political elites cannot 
reach a stable agreement  on land reform, land redistribution will be hindered even further. As it 
already stands, the first ad hoc committee established to assist with the drafting of the necessary 
amendments has collapsed as it was unable to complete its work within the given time frame. Current 
land reform policy has the ability to make sufficient land reform progress. However, the South 
African government has an implementation problem. This has also caused an increase in tension 
among political elites across the three political parties being studied in this study. It is clear that the 
ANC, the DA and the EFF have conflicting ideological views on what land reform policy would be 
best suited for South Africa.  
The chapter above explores the history of land dispossession during colonialism and apartheid to 
understand the importance of land reform in the country. It has also provided acknowledgement of 
how land reform policies have changed in South Africa from colonialism to contemporary South 







Chapter 5: Analysis: Examining elite consensus across the ANC, DA 
and EFF 
5.1 Introduction  
The objective of this chapter is to examine positions and policies on land reform across the three 
largest political parties in South Africa. Current land reform approaches are a result of elite consensus 
grown out of previous compromises between opposing interest groups and political parties during the 
transition to democracy. However, there is a lack of agreement  among political elites on how to 
effectively move forward with land reform. A lack of consensual unity over the fundamentals of land 
reform may hinder further land reform initiatives.  
This chapter examines the three largest political parties’ stances on the key central contentious issues 
pertaining to land reform such as the issue of expropriation without compensation and the need for 
constitutional amendments. In doing so, it applies the following guiding indicators to identify 
evidence of elite consensus on land reform:  
1. Consensus on core values and agreement over vital policy matters: evidence of a shared core 
values relating to land reform and related policy outcomes   
a. Do elites share consensus on core values underpinning land reform? 
b. Do elites equally regard land reform as a vital policy?  
c. Do they share a common vision on the policy of land reform? 
2. Procedural and institutional consensus: evidence of a shared understanding and tacit 
consensus about rules of the game and codes of political conduct  
a. Do elites accept one another as legitimate participants in the political process? 
b. Do elites accept the political institutions they frequent (Parliament) as legitimate? 
c. Do elites accept the legitimacy of the Constitutional order? 
5.2 Consensus on shared core values and agreement relating to land reform and 
related policy outcomes   
This section discusses each political parties’ individual stance on the general issue of land reform. In 
particular, the section discusses the extent to which these elites share consensus on core values 
underpinning land reform; whether they equally regard land reform as a vital policy, and whether 
they share a common vision on the policy of land reform. 
5.2.1 Core values on land reform 




Before beginning, it is important to make a distinction between the ANC as governing party and the 
ANC as a political party. Land reform policies have been developed under the ANC as a political 
party.  The ANC as a governing party was key in determining the policies and legislation discussed 
in Chapter 4. Once the legislation mentioned in Chapter 4 was formulated, it was approved and 
adopted by the Parliament of South Africa. Once legislation is adopted, the regulations became final. 
Land reform policies have also reflected ANC values as a political party. Land restitution and land 
redistribution are a common vision for the ANC political party as well as legislation that was approved 
by the ANC government. For instance, the provision made for the amendment of the Constitution to 
allow for the expropriation of land without compensation is considered ANC policy from the political 
party for land reform - this will be discussed later in the chapter. It has not yet been approved by 
Parliament and adopted by the ANC government. The following section highlights the values and 
vision attributed to the ANC as a political party outside of government.  
The ANC as a political party and the ANC as a governing party share similarities in their vision for 
land reform programmes. The ANC as a political party encapsulates access to land, land redistribution 
and restitution as essential vital aspects of government legislation.  
Since the transition to democracy, the African National Congress has implemented several land 
reform programmes to address the historical dispossession of land. The promise of land reform was 
introduced to empower citizens and to extend an opportunity for them to become landowners. The 
main objective was to reduce poverty. Land reform had three main focus areas: mainly: land 
restitution, land tenure and land redistribution. The following areas of focus are described and 
attributed to both the ANC as a political party. These policies highlight important aspects of the 
legislation approved by the Parliament of South Africa that the ANC as a political party consider 
important for land reform.   
Land Restitution: Land restitution is the restoration of rights in land. This means that the right of land 
or a portion of the land that was dispossessed after June 1913 is returned to its rightful owners. The 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, determines that an individual or community whose land 
was dispossessed, can claim for restitution of the right in land or redress. On the other hand, land 
redistribution is the provision of certain land for settlement purposes.  
For land restitution, the government compensated individuals who had been forcefully removed from 
their land. Land restitution was one of the ANC’s key focuses since the transition to democracy in 
1994. On a legal basis, land restitution was provided for in the interim Constitution, section 25 (7) of 
the 1996 Constitution and the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. Progress on handling land 




approach shifted from a judicial one to an administrative one in 1999. Beneficiaries now had direct 
access to the Land Claims Court instead of having to go through the Commission on Restitution of 
Land Rights first.  
These legislative changes govern the process of land reform through making land claims, 
redistribution, expropriation and restitution. The main aim of land restitution was to ensure equitable 
redress of victims of land dispossession (South African History Online, 2014). Moreover, it makes 
provision for the restitution of land rights to those who were dispossessed, and addresses restitution 
claims within the given period. The deadline to address the restitution claims was set for 2005. 
However, the deadline was extended to 2011 (South African History Online, 2014). In 2012, the ANC 
introduced a new policy on land restitution. This policy was directly based on section 25 of the 
Constitution that stipulated that expropriation of land must compensated in a “just and equitable” 
way. Expropriation is only allowed if it is in “the public interest” or for “public purpose” (Tolsi, 
2012). It was decided that the compensation for land to be expropriated would be determined by the 
courts if prices of land could not be determined by the individuals. Additionally, if land is not utilised 
to its full potential by owners and those it had been restituted to, the land would be taken. It had also 
been decided upon that expropriation without compensation would only occur if land was acquired 
illegally (African National Congress, 2012). The courts would determine which land was acquired 
illegally. This would depend on the evidence provided (African National Congress, 2012).  
The land restitution programme was implemented in 1998 to address land dispossession. However, 
there were severe backlogs once beneficiaries began making land claims. By the end of 2011, a total 
of 79 696 land claims were submitted and 76 023 claims were settled (Sizani, 2012). The deadline 
for finalising land claims was postponed four times following 2002. While 30 percent of the country’s 
land was intended to be redistributed by 2014, land restitution programmes failed for the following 
reasons:  
- White farmers and landowners kept increasing the price of their land; 
- Expropriated land given to black farmers was misused; 
- Resources constraints contributed to the inefficiency of the courts to deal with land claims 
(Sizani, 2012).  
Land Redistribution: The redistribution of land was a provision made to improve the quality of life 
and livelihoods for previously disadvantaged communities and individuals by acquiring land. This 
legislative framework was created to govern the process of land reform and ensure equitable redress 
to victims of land dispossession. The collective purpose of land reform is to ensure that 30 percent of 




focuses on relocating the land back to those who were deprived of their land during colonialism and 
the apartheid era. The land redistribution programme gained momentum in 1998 when almost 250 
000 individuals had received land. In 1999, 50 000 individuals had received land and 446 
redistribution projects had been implemented (Cliffe, 2000: 275).  
The ANC political partyhas been heavily reliant on the notion of “willing-buyer, willing-seller” 
(Lahiff, 2007: 1577). This concept is a market-led reform programme that was influenced by the 
World Bank and enjoyed by landowners. Land was bought from its owners (the willing seller) by the 
government and was redistributed to the willing buyer (Lahiff, 2007: 1577). However, this 
programme has been blamed for the slow progress and failings of land reform programmes in the 
country. In February 2014, in President Zuma’s State of the Nation Address, he stated that the willing-
buyer, willing-seller principle is “not working” (Zuma, 2014). President Zuma proposed changes to 
the programme and outlined the following five points:  
- “Develop district land reform committees where all farmers, stakeholders and beneficiaries 
seeking redress work together to find land available for land reform”;  
- “The government buying land at 50 percent of the market value”; 
- “Farmers gaining economic empowerment status if they are willing to sell their land at 50 
percent of its market value”; 
- “Increasing financing for land reform”;  
- “Increasing investment in agricultural development and research” (Zuma, 2014).  
Land Tenure: Land tenure was a programme that was implemented to recognise individuals’ “rights 
to own land and land redistribution is seen as the most important component (Cliffe, 2000: 275). The 
land tenure programme seeks to address problems in relation to insecure, disputed and overlapping 
land rights. The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights, Act 31 of 1996, the Communal Property 
Associations, Act 28 of 1996, and the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, were all laws 
that were implemented to facilitate land reform. These laws protect individuals from insecure tenure, 
and from losing their land rights and enables communities to acquire and manage land under the 
regulations stipulated within the Constitution (Cliffe, 2000: 275). The main aim of this programme is 
to change the institutional and legal framework of land administration.  
The ANC as a political party has developed and has implemented several land reform programmes to 
redress inequality in land ownership and to unlock the economic prospective of land. The party 
supports land redistribution and land restitution programmes that support agricultural investment 
(African National Congress, 2018). Therefore, it is imperative that agricultural skills development 




should be provided with the opportunities and assets to sustain their livelihoods (African National 
Congress, 2019).    
Democratic Alliance 
The Democratic Alliance (DA) supports land reform and supports objectives to “achieve redress in 
rural communities, promote economic inclusion to lift rural people out of poverty, and supports 
growth and prosperity in the agricultural sector” (Democratic Alliance, 2013: 3). Land reform 
should be seen as a mechanism for economic development. As land use is connected to food 
production and security, “policies that affect land ownership and land use must prioritise the need to 
ensure the continued supply of food at prices that are affordable to ordinary South Africans” 
(Democratic Alliance, 2013: 3).  
Land reform can be a powerful tool for imperative redress of the injustices of the past, as well as 
economic development for communities and individuals (Democratic Alliance, 2019: 21). The DA 
states “that apartheid policies have caused substantial distortions in the distribution of land between 
black and white South Africans” (2013: 4). These laws have “institutionalised the informal tenure of 
arrangements which have been a fundamental factor in developing South Africa’s dualistic 
agricultural sector that has established a commercial farming sector that co-exists with a wide range 
of subsistence farms that are owned under communal land” (Democratic Alliance, 2013: 5). A small 
number of commercial farmers are responsible for approximately 95 percent of agricultural output in 
the country. It is estimated that there are 200 000 commercially orientated farm owners, most  of 
whom function in former homeland areas. Moreover, 2.9 million households are reported as 
“subsistence producers” who produce food for their own consumption (Democratic Alliance, 2013: 
5).  
Land Tenure: An estimated 21 million South African citizens live on approximately 17 million 
hectares of communal land. This amounts to almost 17 percent of South Africa’s total farming land; 
because of this, tenure security should be a priority for the South African Government. The DA has 
argued that the National Development Plan (NDP) does not identify sufficient protection of tenure 
rights for black farmers in communal areas. Furthermore, the party argues that it is “nonsensical to 
continue with the discussions on land reform policy if this major risk to the process is a no-go area in 
the debate” (Democratic Alliance, 2013: 10). The provision of urban title deeds should be sped-up to 
ensure that land reform gives ownership to South African citizens. In the party manifesto, it has been 
indicated that current land reform programmes have not enabled the beneficiaries of land reform to 
own their land (Democratic Alliance, 2019: 20) Land should not be state-owned. Beneficiaries should 




without a limitation on the amount of their holding (Democratic Alliance, 2019). Land reform should 
not make the people of South Africa “life-long tenants” (Democratic Alliance, 2019). The ownership 
of land and property rights are the foundation of all successful land reform initiatives; therefore, these 
rights must be protected.  
Land reform models that work: The DA’s policy documents outline models for land reform 
management “through restitution that have proved to be successful or have the potential to become 
successful commercial agricultural” farms (Democratic Alliance, 2013: 14). These include joint 
partnerships between emerging and established farmers to ensure that new farmers that have access 
to land have experienced and skilled agri-business specialists. Moreover, collective relationships 
between farmers, including emerging entrants, will ensure that capital equipment is shared, and that 
skills and resources are pooled for marketing opportunities for products. Furthermore, land reform 
beneficiaries should be able to generate their own “income from their land by permitting other farmers 
to use their land on a contract basis” (Democratic Alliance, 2013: 14). The DA supports proposals set 
out in the National Development Plan (NDP) for “district level land committees that can assist 
government in identifying land for redistribution, organise support for land reform beneficiaries”, 
participate in the distribution of important information about land reform initiatives and provide a 
platform to share success stories of land reform that can be replicated (Democratic Alliance, 2013: 
14). The redistribution of land in South Africa should start by redistributing state-owned land to 
beneficiaries of land reform.  
Support for emerging farmers can be achieved through agricultural support and worker skilling. 
Research shows that land reform output is significantly increased when beneficiaries received 
agricultural development support (Democratic Alliance, 2013: 15). While national land reform policy 
recognises that there is a need to support subsistence farmers, the Government’s support structures 
are unsuitable for small-scale farmers (Democratic Alliance, 2013: 16). Approximately 70 percent of 
South African citizens live in rural areas and support for subsistence farmers is an essential part of 
reducing poverty. According to the Democratic Alliance (2013: 16), the most significant deficiency 
in the current support system is the fact that beneficiaries only receive training once the land has been 
transferred. Training should be rolled out before beneficiaries receive the land. This proposal is 
consistent with the approaches set out in the NDP that states that training and skills development 
should precede land transfers.  
Economic Freedom Fighters 
Among the EFF’s key non-negotiable pillars for economic freedom are:  




- “Nationalisation of banks, mines and other strategic sectors without compensation”; 
- “State agencies” (Malema, 2013).  
In the EFF’s founding manifesto, the party claims that the South African Government planned to 
redistribute 30 percent of the land back to the beneficiaries of land reform by 2014. However, by 
2012, the government had only redistributed 8 percent of the land (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013: 
4). The main consequence of this failure is that the majority of “blacks on farms remain slaves denied 
of basic human rights that most people take for granted” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013: 4). 
Farmworkers and labour tenants are underpaid and overworked, and this is due to the laws that were 
developed by the post-1994 government. According to the EFF (2013: 4) between 1994 and 2004, 
white farmers had evicted approximately 1 million workers from their land and these workers are 
now populating “squatter camps on the outskirts of townships”. Instead of trying to correct these 
failures, the ANC has merely changed the deadlines to 2030, thereby continuing to endorse policies 
that have failed in the first 20 years since the transition to democracy (Economic Freedom Fighters, 
2013: 4). Therefore, the EFF stated that it will be involved in mass movements and protests that seek 
to improve the lives of South African citizens. Furthermore, the party claimed that it will associate 
with movements that demand land reform through “land occupation that is aimed at making the 
message clear that our people do need the land” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013: 7). Thus, the 
EFF supports workers and trade unions that are willing to stand up for better working conditions and 
salaries. The EFF states that it will not “compromise the interests of farm workers because they belong 
to different trade” unions (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013: 7). Its main goal is ensuring that black 
people “fashion in the course of the struggles” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013: 7). Expropriation 
without compensation is one of the party’s main strategic missions, along with the “nationalisation 
of mines, banks and other strategic sectors of the economy” to ensure that there is equal redistribution 
of the country’s wealth (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013: 8). Attaining economic freedom requires 
that multinational and private ownership “of the economy be discontinued, and all economic wealth 
directed to the ownership and benefit of all people” (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013: 7). This will 
be achieved through a range of combined forms of collective ownership, varying from co-operatives 
and workers to state ownership and control of the central sectors of the economy. According to the 
EFF, state ownership will be implemented within this context, a fundamental component that will 
“lead to continuous forms of collective ownership, benefit and control, and therefore not narrow 
State-capitalism” (2013: 8). 




This section closely examines a crucial and contentious aspect of land reform in South Africa, that of 
expropriation without compensation, in order to establish the extent of elite consensus on this central 
policy aspect.  
According to section 25 of the Constitution, no property, including land, may be expropriated 
arbitrarily; only for public use/interest. However, under certain circumstance, “it may be just and 
equitable for nil compensation to be paid where land is expropriated in the public interest” 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
In 2018, a new Expropriation Bill was released which stipulated the five kinds of property that are 
subject to expropriation without compensation, all of which the ANC has agreed with, namely:  
- “Abandoned property where legal experts have argued that such buildings are “easy targets 
for expropriation” 
- “Property owned by Transnet and Eskom as this land is owned by a state-owned corporation” 
- “Land held for speculation”  
- “Land into which the state has already invested more than its value” 
- “Farms with labour tenants” (de Wet, 2018).  
According to Elmiem Du Plessis, an Associate Law Professor at North-West University, 
expropriation is a means for the government to take possession of property as opposed to obtaining 
land in the open market, based on market value principles and procedures (2018). Only the 
government has the power to expropriate land, “no person or court can force the state to use these 
powers” (Du Plessis, 2018). When the government decides to use its power to expropriate land, the 
owner whose land is being expropriated does not have the authority to choose not to be expropriated. 
It is important to note that this does not mean that the owners’ rights are not protected. The 
Constitution specifies that expropriation must be executed in accordance to the law of general 
application that it must be in the public interest or for public purpose; against equitable and just 
payment of compensation when expropriation is enacted (Expropriation Act 63 of 1975).  
This is a justifiable limitation on private property rights, and if executed in accordance to the rule of 
law and when compensation is provided, does not diminish the framework of private property rights 
(Du Plessis, 2018). Expropriation is an important mechanism for fast tracking land reform in the 
country. According to Du Plessis (2018), in terms of South African law, expropriation must not only 
be enacted for public purpose but also for public interest. In the Constitution, public interest includes 
the country’s commitment to land reform. It has been argued that this leaves room for the government 
to expropriate private property and assign it to a beneficiaries of land reform. However, with regard 




the owner has the right to apply to have their property reinstated (Du Plessis, 2018). The government’s 
power to expropriate land is not unusual. Most governments “need this power to ensure that public 
projects, such as building roads, are possible and not crippled by one individual that is not willing to 
sell their land (Du Plessis, 2018). 
Expropriation is an important mechanism for fast tracking land reform in a country. However, 
whether compensation is paid or not is a different matter. The ANC had argued in the early years of 
democracy that the expropriation of land was necessary under certain circumstances, where 
compensation is payable for land expropriation by the state. This payment should be just and 
equitable. However, the ANC recently changed its views on this matter. After supporting the market-
led land reform programme of willing-buyer, willing-seller, the ANC changed its policy to advance 
the expropriation of land without compensation policy. This policy was endorsed at the 54th 
conference of the ANC in December 2017. In January 2018, President Ramaphosa stated that 
expropriating land should not destroy the economy. It should allow the economy to grow, as well as 
growing farm production (Ntsebeza, 2018). Ramaphosa argued that the ANC’s objective is to build 
the potential of South Africa’s agriculture to create employment, transform the economy and promote 
industrialisation.  
Two proposals were made by the ANC to amend section 25 of the Constitution. The first proposal 
was released in July 2018. The first proposal covered the amendment of subsections (2)(b) and (3) of 
section 25 of the Constitution as follows: “(2)(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and 
the time and manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
approved by a court: provided that a court may determine that no compensation is payable in the 
event of expropriation of land for the purposes of land reform” (De Oliveira, 2019). Additionally, (3) 
“where compensation is payable, the amount of the compensation and the time and manner of 
payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and 
the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances” (De Oliveira, 2019).  
This proposed amendment gives the courts the supreme decision-making power to determine whether 
compensation for expropriated land will be payable. This proposal included the plans to amend the 
Constitution to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation. Ramaphosa admitted that 
section 25 of the Constitution already allows for the expropriation of land without compensation in 
the public interest or for public use (Marrian and Mvumvu, 2018).  
At this point, the ANC’s stance on the expropriation of land without compensation remained unclear. 
There was a disunity in the views of the ANC and its alliances over whether constitutional 




2019, takes away the power of the court to determine whether compensation for expropriated land is 
payable. This power was given to “expropriating authorities” as set out in the draft Land 
Expropriation Bill as a division of the state or an individual entitled by the Act to obtain land through 
expropriation.  
Land use determinations include, among other factors, how the land was first acquired and the way 
in which the land is currently being utilised. According to Webber, “the target of land reform in the 
past has been to expropriate large tracks of undeveloped, underutilised land and develop such land 
for new housing developments. This will remain unchanged with the amendment. It may, however, 
include the expropriation of agricultural land that will be redistributed to communities, but it should 
be emphasised that such land has to be appropriately valued by a court, if the Ad Hoc Committee has 
chosen this route” (2019). State-owned land, land that is underutilised, agricultural land, abandoned 
land, land held for speculation and farms with labour tenants will continue to be expropriated and 
redistributed to beneficiaries of land reform. The value of this land will be determined by the court, 
should the Ad Hoc Committee choose this course.  
The ANC has argued that it will provide land to those who work on it and those who need it. For this 
reason, the ANC is supporting expropriation without compensation. However, according to a speech 
President Ramaphosa delivered in Kimberley on 8 January 2020, land will be redistributed in a way 
that sustains food security and promotes economic growth (Mkentane, 2020). Moreover, 
expropriation will be done in line with the provisions made in the Constitution.  
In an interview with Bloomberg Politics in October 2018, Ronald Lamola, the ANC’s spokesperson 
on land affairs, stated that expropriation without compensation will only be implemented in certain 
circumstances and this will be guided by the Constitution. The main aim of expropriation without 
compensation is to allow all South Africans to have the opportunity to participate in the economy 
through agricultural measures. Moreover, the ANC believes that all citizens (white, black, coloured, 
and Indian) must be included in the distribution of land. 
Lamola expressed that the ANC’s land reform programme protects private property rights and that 
expropriation will only be implemented in certain circumstances, as mentioned earlier in the 
paragraph. Property rights will be safeguarded, and expropriation does not diminish this right. The 
only way in which property rights will be diminished is if the country’s land is nationalised (Lamola, 
2018).  
The Economic Freedom Fighters are explicitly in favour of the expropriation of land without 
compensation. The EFF’s land reform approach is that all land should be transferred to the 




were transferred to the custodianship and ownership of the government through the Minerals and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 22 of 2002. The government should have the capacity to 
transfer all land to the state where land will be used and administered for sustainable-development 
purposes (Economic Freedom Fighters, 2013: 9). This transfer of land will occur without 
compensation being paid and will be applied to all South African citizens. Land leases will be given 
for a maximum of 25 years, with the government reserving the power to expropriate the land in any 
circumstances where land is not being used for the purposes that applicants have applied for. 
According to Malema, expropriation without compensation should be seen as a means of socio-
economic redress and should be implemented as the key mechanism for land reform. (Head, 2019). 
The EFF’s policy clearly stipulates that the state should be the “custodian of all South African land” 
(Hall, 2018). 
The EFF first introduced their motion to amend the Expropriation Act in 2017. After successfully 
forcing the amendment of the Constitution, the National Assembly adopted the motion to review 
section 25 of the Constitution on 27 February 2018 (Merten, 2018). The initial motion of the party 
was discussions of the state owning all land. However, this motion was overruled by Parliament.  
In the EFF’s 2019 Manifesto, the party promised the expropriation of land without compensation. It 
was argued that expropriation should be the main mechanism of land reform as land is the “master 
key” which should be used to address the legacy of land dispossession and crippling poverty in the 
country (Head, 2019). The EFF has posited that:  
- Section 25 of the Constitution will be amended to allow for the expropriation of land without 
compensation  
- 50 percent of land will be owned by the youth and women 
- An end to all foreign land ownership  
- A council will be established to handle all issues dealing with the expropriation without 
compensation policy  
While the ANC did not initially agree, arguing that the Constitution already allows for the 
expropriation of land without compensation, in 2018, the ANC changed its view and agreed with the 
motion to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation. Today, both the ANC and the 
EFF support the expropriation of land without compensation and propose the amendment of section 
25 of the Constitution to achieve this goal.  
There is, however, one significant difference that should be taken into account. The EFF wants to 




expropriation without compensation as merely one of the key mechanisms for land reform and 
redistribution. The ANC has argued that nationalisation would undermine future investment and 
damage agricultural production and food security. The ANC has argued that the expropriation of land 
without compensation should be implemented in a way that promotes economic development, food 
production and food security. However, following three years of negotiations about the policy, the 
ANC has not yet clearly outlined how this will be achieved and how expropriation without 
compensation will be implemented. The EFF has compromised its position on the nationalisation of 
land in order to come to an agreement with the ANC on expropriation of land without compensation 
and the subsequent amendment of section 25 of the Constitution to allow for this.  
By contrast, the DA explicitly opposes the expropriation of land without compensation. According to 
the DA, land reform programmes should focus on land redistribution, on ensuring that beneficiaries 
of land reform become owners of their land, and as a mechanism for economic development. 
Expropriation without compensation would make citizens of South Africa tenants on their own land. 
Property rights would be violated, and citizens would not enjoy security of tenure. The party firmly 
believes that the land should not be returned to the state and South African citizens should not become 
tenants of their own land. 
The DA has warned that expropriation without compensation could also increase the fragility of the 
country’s economy and could collapse the country’s financial system (Business Tech, 2020). 
According to Steenhuisen, land expropriation without compensation is not a realistic mechanism for 
land reform because land expropriation without compensation will be “paid for by the negative effects 
on the economy” (My Africa, 2019). While the ANC ensures that expropriation without compensation 
will not diminish private property rights, the DA firmly opposes that view and argues that 
expropriation without compensation would take away individuals’ rights to own land or their own 
private property (Maimane, 2018). Expropriation will violate private property rights. Private property 
rights are the cornerstone of any successful liberal democracy. Therefore, these rights need to be 
protected. 
Moreover, according to Glynis Breytenbach, a DA member of Parliament, expropriation without 
compensation could enable corruption (2019). The DA has stated that the main reason why current 
land reform programmes have failed is because of deeply embedded corruption, lack of capacity and 
training, lack of political will, and diversions of land reform budgets. All of these are essential factors 
to meaningful land reform (Montsho, 2019).  
The DA has warned against radical populism in South Africa. Steenhuisen argued that if the South 




necessary. Land expropriation without compensation is merely a hoax to distract South African 
citizens from the vast backlogs in land restitution and land redistribution.  
Using race as a cover-up for the abuse of power, talk of genocide, damaging socialist policies, and 
incitement has “only guaranteed more poverty and suffering” (Maimane, 2018). The expropriation of 
land without compensation has crippled countries such as Zimbabwe and Venezuela. According to 
Maimane, land expropriation without compensation should not be evaluated in isolation (2018). Land 
expropriation without compensation is a destructive concoction of nationalisation, land expropriation, 
the centralisation of power, populism and corruption that will lead to the collapse of the country 
(Maimane, 2018). None of these factors is conducive to building a country that is inclusive of all its 
citizens. The DA firmly believes in the promotion and protection of private property rights. Land 
expropriation without compensation impedes on private property rights and makes South African 
citizens tenants of the land and not land owners (Maimane, 2018).  
The party claims that they will achieve meaningful land reform by giving black citizens the 
opportunity to own both urban and agricultural land:  
- Beneficiaries will receive full title deeds of their state-subsidised houses, as well as recipients 
of previous RDP homes;  
- First-time buyers will have more affordable land to purchase through lowering transfer costs;  
- State-owned land will be distributed, instead of treating first time farmers as tenants of the 
land;  
- Residents will receive tribal land tenure security that has been legally recorded;    
- Adequate budgets will be set out to settle all remaining land restitution claims;  
- Any individual that wants to farm will receive the support and skills training needed to be 
successful (Democratic Alliance, 2018).  
These objectives can be achieved without amending the Constitution (Democratic Alliance, 2018). 
The Land and Agricultural Development Bank has also cautioned that expropriating land without any 
compensation could cost the South African government R41 billion if the state is compelled to repay 
the state’s debt promptly (van Tilburg, 2020). Additionally, farmers presently owe R190 billion in 
agricultural debt (van Tilburg, 2020). The ANC would be accumulating an additional R230 billion in 
debt.    
Consensual unity is low because of conflicting ideological views on land reform. Political ideologies 
are the basis of any political party (Koekemoer, 2017: 17). The ANC’s ideologies have been 




considerable impact on the party (Koekemoer, 2017: 17). This also helps understand why ANC 
practices and policies include radical, liberal and socialist spectrums (Koekemoer, 2017: 17) 
Presently, the party is divided between the values and attitudes of its founders and those who seek 
political power for personal gain.  
Liberalism is the core ideology of the DA. Its core concept is an “open society for all”. The party is 
broadly centrist, and has administered both centre-right and centre-left policies (Koekemoer, 2017: 
18).  
The EFF was established by Julius Malema, who was a long-time member of the ANC. Malema is 
well known for his controversial behaviour and statements in Parliament which led to his dismissal 
from the ANC in 2012. The EFF has presented itself as a “radical Leftist, anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist movement” (McKenna, 2019). The EFF continues to promote the controversial 
propositions Malema promoted while a member of the ANC, including the nationalisation of the 
mines and the expropriation of land without compensation (McKenna, 2019). The main goal of the 
EFF is economic liberation. This clear divide in ideologies between the three political parties has had 
a clear impact on the decision-making process in relation to the land question.  
In sum, various segments of the legislation were implemented to redress past inequalities brought 
about by land dispossession. Section 25 of the Constitution stipulates that a community or person 
dispossessed of land is entitled to equitable compensation or restitution of the property. Government 
has the responsibility to ensure that beneficiaries have access to land on an equitable basis and if a 
person has insecure tenure due to past discriminatory laws, these communities or individuals are 
entitled to tenure that is legally secure or to comparable redress. The Expropriation Act makes 
provision for the expropriation of land for public interest. Moreover, it stipulates that compensation 
is just and equitable, should land expropriation occur.  
The White Paper on land policy provides the framework for land reform. The main objective of White 
Paper is that land redistribution programmes should provide the poor with access to land, in order to 
improve their quality of life. Land restitution made provision for Provision is made for three wide-
ranging categories of relief: restoring the land being claimed, granting alternative land to beneficiaries 
or payment of compensation. In 2003, an amendment was made to the Restitution Act stipulating that 
land could be expropriated by ministerial order. Land tenure made provision to strengthen and protect 
land rights. This reform was established to ensure that the tenure rights of victims of past 
discrimination are secure. Lastly, land redistribution Land redistribution seeks to address the 




All three political parties involved in this study regard land reform as vital policy. According to the 
ANC, land reform policy should be seen as a mechanism to redress the injustices of the past through 
land restitution and redistribution as its main focus. However, the party has not disregarded land 
tenure as an important part of the legislation. With regards to the DA, the party claims that land reform 
should be seen as a mechanism for economic development. Moreover, the party agrees with the ANC 
in believing that land reform should be seen as a powerful tool to redress the injustices of the past. 
However, the DA places emphasis on land tenure arguing that providing urban title deeds should be 
sped-up to ensure that land reform makes citizens land owners. Land should not be state owned. For 
the DA, land ownership should be considered the foundation of all land reform initiatives. While the 
EFF agrees that land reform is vital policy. However, the party has a radical stance on how land 
reform should be achieved. Each political party merely places emphasis on different areas of the 
legislation implemented by government.  
Political leaders have agreed that land reform is essential policy. However, the ANC has placed its 
focus on land restitution and redistribution, the DA considers land tenure the basis of all its land 
reform initiatives and the EFF maintains that all land should be state owned. According to the EFF, 
this can be achieved through the expropriation of land without compensation, nationalization of this 
land and owned by state. Prior to the EFF proposing that land should be expropriated without 
compensation, one can argue that the ANC and the DA had the same objectives with regard to land 
reform policy as that of the ANC. In 2014 when the land restitution bill was passed, the ANC and the 
DA were in agreement. The DA merely attempted to introduce additional amendments, but were 
outvoted by the ANC (eNCA, 2011).   
When the EFF was established and proposed that land should be expropriated without compensation, 
the ANC changed its vision for land reform in stating that land should be expropriated without 
compensation to speed up land reform. The DA argues that expropriation without compensation 
would be unconstitutional as it would violate land owner’s property rights. All three political parties 
regard land reform as vital policy. However, there is disagreement about the vision of land reform 
policy and how it should be achieved. The ANC and DA’s vision for land reform policy in accordance 
to the legislation implemented were similar, with the ANC placing focus on land restitution and 
redistribution and the DA emphasizing land tenure. However, this changed with the establishment of 
the EFF. The ANC then changed its stance to include the expropriation of land without compensation 
to speed-up the redistribution of land. Both the ANC and the DA disagree with EFF’s policy vision 
that land should be expropriated without compensation then nationalized. The ANC and DA believe 
that land should be redistributed to land reform beneficiaries to redress the injustices of past land 




this disagreement among elites on how land reform should be achieved had hindered efficient land 
reform. 
5.2.3 Summary analysis: extent of elite consensus on core values and common 
vision 
The previous section discussed the extent to which these elites share consensus on core values 
underpinning land reform, whether they equally regard land reform as a vital policy, and whether they 
share a common vision on the policy of land reform. This section concludes that while elites share 
consensus that land reform is a vital and pressing policy issue, they do not necessarily share a common 
vision.   
There is a larger degree of elite consensus on the issue of expropriation of land across the ANC and 
the EFF. Both political parties cooperated in national Parliament to adopt the motion to amend section 
25 of the Constitution to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation. While the ANC 
and the EFF support the expropriation of land in principle they differ on the question of payment of 
compensation (reviewed in the following section) and nationalisation. The ANC does not support the 
nationalisation of the country’s land. The party’s reasoning for this is that the nationalisation of land 
has the potential to collapse the economy.  
The DA opposes both the expropriation of land without compensation, and the principle of 
nationalisation of land. The DA has stated that the country is not financially equipped for 
expropriation without compensation and that it has the ability to harm the country’s economy. 
Moreover, expropriation violates the constitutional property rights of landowners.  
The ANC and EFF have argued that the issue of land in the country is a black versus white problem 
and that the legacies of colonialism and apartheid were characterised by the forced dispossession of 
land owned by the indigenous population. Colonialism and apartheid created an economic system 
that conquered the black population to serve the interests of the white settlers.  However, the DA 
claims otherwise. It is about “the very essence of constitutionalism; the people should own the land, 
not the state. Land should not be returned to the state and black South Africans should not be made 
tenants in their own land” (Maimane, 2018).  
Moreover, political elites among the ANC, the DA and the EFF have been unable to reach a consensus 
on the land question due to the profound value-based and ideological disagreements as to what 
constitutes land reform in the country. For the DA, land reform means making all South Africans land 
owners, not land tenants. The DA argues that the ANC and EFF’s land reform makes the state the 




infringes citizens’ property rights and their right to own land. For the EFF, land reform means that all 
land should be nationalised and distributed equally back to black South Africans to address the 
injustices of the past. The ANC is focused on addressing the injustices of land dispossession through 
land restitution and land redistribution. The ANC has admitted their failures in addressing the land 
question and claims that the expropriation of land without compensation will fast-track efficient land 
reform. 
With regard to the criteria mentioned at the start of chapter, it should be noted that there is elite 
consensus among the political elites within the ANC, the DA and the EFF on the core values of land 
reform. Each political party regards land reform as vital policy in South Africa and all agree that land 
reform should be seen as a mechanism to redress the injustices of past land dispossession. However, 
disunity materialises on vital policy matters, i.e. the expropriation of land without compensation.  
5.3 Consensus about institutional rules of the game and codes of political 
conduct  
This section discusses each political party’s individual stance towards each other and towards the 
broader political institutions and Constitutional framework within which they operate as they 
endeavour to find consensus on the issue of land reform. In particular, the section discusses the extent 
to which these elites accept one another as legitimate participants in the political process, accept the 
political institutions they frequent (Parliament) as legitimate, and whether they especially accept the 
legitimacy of the Constitutional order. 
5.3.1 Do elites accept one another as legitimate? 
It is important for this study to examine these elite’s style of engagement with each other. In 
particular, how do political elites conduct themselves and towards the other in terms of their tone, 
rhetoric and behaviour toward each other. Are South Africa’s political elites antagonistic? Are they 
co-operative and are they willing to compromise on the policy issue? How elites communicate and 
engage each other shapes elite consensus around policy issues. A consensually unified political elite 
is essential for democracy and democratic stability. A consensually unified political elite means that 
its “members share a set of informal rules and norms, i.e. procedural rules of a democracy. However, 
they may disagree on substantive questions” (Zavecz, 2017: 5). Therefore, political elites can ensure 
political stability is maintained, as sharing a set of informal rules and norms prevents disorderly 
actions from occurring and ensures that political issues are debated in a manner that does not 
undermine democratic stability (Zavecz, 2017: 5). Higley and Pakulski state that democratic stability 




charged conflicts during the decision-making process, and competing for political power in a 
regulated approach (2008: 16). Growing disunity, conflict and distrust among political elite groups, 
especially if there are debates around the shared rules and norms, can lead to a decrease in political 
stability (Higly and Pakulski, 2008: 16).  
How do political elites interact with one another? How is their communication important to politics 
in the country? Elite political culture is characterised by patterns of behaviour. These patterns of 
behaviour, values and mindsets have a direct effect on the political outcomes of the country. 
Moreover, the actions and interests of the political elite shape mass political culture (Inglehart, 2000: 
271). Elite political culture is the opinions and perspectives political elites have about the political 
system, its day-to-day activities and the commitments they adhere to.  
Political elites are “politically diverse” groups of leaders (Gulbrandsen and Engelstad, 2005: 899). 
As the leaders of a political regime, these political elites act as representatives of the people. These 
individuals have been elected to act on behalf of the country’s citizens, addressing their interests and 
concerns (Gulbrandsen and Engelstad, 2005: 899). Therefore, it is imperative that mutual consensus, 
accommodation and compromise exists among these political elite to ensure the maintenance and 
stability of the democratic regime (Gulbrandsen and Engelstad, 2005: 899).  
The significance of the political elites and their attitudes and behaviour, is their ability to strike 
compromises and cooperate with one another to reach a consensus about how to address policy issues 
and to preserve the democratic regime (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2009: 66). Here, the way in which 
political elites communicate with one another is essential. It is important that each respects the views 
of other parties. The involvement of political elites requires debates, discussions, negotiations and 
compromises. These factors are all essential to democratic governance (Herson and Hofstetter, 1975: 
1012). With an agreement on the decision-making process and codes of conduct, members of the 
political elite accept decisions made in parliament, even if they do not agree with the decision made 
because it is what is considered best for the political system. This makes the policy process more 
sufficient.  
When political elites are unwilling to negotiate and compromise public policy issues, this delays the 
policymaking process.  It is important that there is some agreement among political elites from 
various political elite groups on policy issues that are considered discordant (Baylis, 2012: 91). The 
reason for this is that during parliamentary procedures, such as committee meetings, debates and 
discussions are on policy issues and a vote is taken by all members of parliament. In order for a bill 





All decisions that are made in the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa are based on majority 
rule principle. It is required that more than half of all members of parliament who have cast their vote 
to agree in order to make a decision on the issues and solutions being voted on (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996).  
The elite political culture in South Africa can be described as antagonistic and disdainful. In 
particular, the way in which political elites communicate with one another is problematic. This 
behaviour among political elites has hindered efficient decision-making on various policy issues.  
According to Bachrach (1962: 442), the characteristics that are deemed important for elite consensus 
are the willingness to compromise on policy issues, cooperation between various political 
parties/groups, and respecting each member’s views, including those from opposition parties. When 
debating and negotiating stances on the land question in parliament, political elites from the three 
parties uncooperative and disruptive.  
Members of Parliament behave in an “unparliamentary” manner. Unparliamentary behaviour is any 
assertion, gesture or remark that disregards the respect that members are required to afford each other 
during the proceedings of parliament. Moreover, unparliamentary behaviour can also be deemed by 
the presiding officer as provocative, threatening or offensive. These include personal insults, attacks, 
or obscene language, “none of which are rendered parliamentary by being framed as a question, used 
hypothetically or being quoted” (People’s Assembly, 2014). Unparliamentary behaviour is not 
applicable to political parties, only to individuals, “and include, but are not limited to, unsubstantiated 
allegations, nickname references and animal noises” (People’s Assembly, 2014). Political elites 
among the ANC, the DA and the EFF have displayed specific “proclivity for using animal references 
to insult fellow members, all of which have consequently been declared unparliamentary” (People’s 
Assembly, 2014). For instance, at a land debate in 2019, the EFF’s Floyd Shivambu called out the 
ANC’s Mosiuoa Lekota on his stance on the expropriation of land without compensation. Lekota 
stated that the Constitution specifically states that South Africans should not be deprived of their land 
(My Africa, 2019). According to Lekota, when land is expropriated, compensation should be paid. 
Shivambu, in a very condescending manner, continued and asked whether Lekota was paid by the 
“fascists from the nationalist party to come and squash the land problem” (My Africa, 2019). 
Moreover, Shivambu undermined Lekota’s contributions to the liberation movement (My Africa, 
2019).    
The DA uses anti-ANC and anti-EFF sentiments to attract South African citizens to their cause. 
According to the DA, people who continue to support the ANC and EFF also continue to support 




to themselves as the only feasible choice to the ANC and are very critical of the ANC and EFF policy 
decisions. During SONA 2017, the DA walked out of parliament, while the EFF was violently thrown 
out, yelling out that the ANC had used its resources to protect the Gupta family, while the ANC 
shouted that the DA MPs are racists (Lowman, 2017). Moreover, Jacob Zuma chuckled as the EFF 
was thrown out of Parliament. Chaos in Parliament is not a rare occurrence in South Africa. Political 
elites among the ANC, the DA and the EFF are condescending in the way they address one another 
in parliament and are also not afraid to insult one another. The unacceptable conduct of members 
during house sittings and debates regularly results in parliament descending into chaos. It can be 
argued that there is no recognition of rules or authority that govern the South African parliament. 
Condescending remarks are made as a “point of order”. Members heckle so loudly that other members 
cannot be heard while debating or responding to questions.  
Members of parliament have freedom of speech. Their freedom of speech is “subject only to the rules 
of the House” (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2020). Members of Parliament must abide 
by the rules and principles of the Standard of Ethical Conduct (Parliament of the Republic of South 
Africa, 2020). However, it has been documented several times how South African elites behave in an 
unparliamentary manner. Therefore, because of this unparliamentary behaviour, political elites 
among the ANC, the DA and the EFF have not reached a consensus on the land question, hence, the 
collapse of the ad hoc committee established in 2018 to address the land question. Political elites 
among the ANC, the DA and the EFF refuse to compromise their positions on the land issue. Political 
elites have disrupted committee meetings and voting panels for the amendment of the Constitution. 
Political elites from various other political parties stated that committee recommendations for land 
reform have been “irrational” (Gerber, 2018). Hence, the ad hoc committee not being able to conclude 
its work and meet its March 2019 deadline. A second ad hoc committee had to be established to fulfil 
its duty in making recommendations to amend the Constitution. Land reform has been at a halt 
considering the committees could not conclude its work.  
The elite political culture in South Africa can be described as antagonistic. Political elites are 
disrespectful because they are condescending in the way in which they address one another in 
parliament. Unacceptable conduct of members often descends parliament into chaos because there is 
no recognition of the rules or authority that govern parliament. According to Higley and Pakulski 
(2008: 24), it is difficult to reach a consensus on policy issues using an elite political culture that is 
based on antagonism and unparliamentary behaviour. It is clear that South African elites struggle to 
reach a consensus on any policy issue.  
In spite of the fact that it has been difficult to reach a consensus on the common vision for land reform 




relation to land reform policy. Elite political culture in South Africa can be described as antagonistic 
and disdainful. Political elites are disruptive and uncooperative during parliamentary meetings. 
However, political elites still follow constitutional framework if a dispute between political parties 
about policy issues is significant. For instance, the DA has vowed to go to court if the Constitutional 
Review Committee recommends that the Constitution be amended to allow for the expropriation of 
land without compensation. Political elites may behave in an unparliamentary manner when dealing 
with policy issues, but this is not significant enough to be considered unconstitutional.  
5.3.2 Do elites accept the legitimacy of the Constitutional order? 
Two of the political parties (ANC and EFF) have argued strongly for a need for Constitutional 
Amendments to the South African Constitution while the DA has argued strongly against this 
proposal.  
In February 2018, at the fifth session on land reform, Julius Malema, the leader of the EFF, argued 
that “the centre of the crisis regarding the resolution of the land question is section 25 of the 
Constitution, the Property Clause, which protects private property rights and requires the state to pay 
compensation when expropriating land in the public interest and for a public purpose” (Parliament of 
the Republic of South Africa, 2018: 8). Furthermore, it was recognised that this property clause has 
made it impossible for previously disadvantaged individuals to get justice for the dispossession of 
their land. President Ramaphosa committed to radical land reform that allows for the expropriation 
of land without compensation in his 2018 State of the Nation Address. Therefore, amending the 
Constitution to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation should go through 
parliamentary processes as Parliament is the only democratic institution in the country that has the 
authority to amend the Constitution (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2018: 8). Therefore, 
an ad hoc committee should be established to review and amend section 25 of the Constitution.  
On 31 July 2018, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced in a Land Reform Debate in Parliament that 
the ANC will propose an amendment of section 25 of the Constitution to provide more clarity on the 
circumstances under which the expropriation of land without compensation can be implemented. 
President Ramaphosa acknowledged that the Constitution already allows for the expropriation of land 
without compensation in specific circumstances. However, the “proposal is intended to make explicit 
what is currently implicit in the Constitution” (My Africa, 2018). The DA’s then leader Maimane 
agreed with President Ramaphosa on this statement. However, Maimane contended that the 
Constitution is not the issue in relation to ineffective land reform in the country. The main issues are 
corruption, a lack of political will to achieve land reform objectives and a lack of state capacity (My 




Africa, 2018). Malema argued that giving beneficiaries title deeds to own land is a “set-up”, because 
the majority of South Africans live in poverty. Once these individuals are given the land with title 
deeds, they will merely sell the land back and the narrative that the land was dispossessed will be 
withdrawn. Therefore, all land should be nationalised (My Africa, 2018). 
On 15 November 2018, a Joint Constitutional Review Committee (JCRC) was held to adopt its report 
in favour of amending section 25 of the Constitution to allow for the expropriation of land without 
compensation in public interest or for public use (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2018). 
The ANC and the EFF voted in favour of the report. The DA voted against the committee report. 
Committee co-chairperson, Mr Lewis Nzimande of the ANC expressed gratitude to the EFF and to 
those who participated in the process of helping the committee decide on this matter. The JCRC was 
formulated to assess whether a “review of section 25 of the Constitution and other clauses is 
necessary, to make it possible for the state to expropriate land in the public interest without 
compensation, and also to propose constitutional amendments where necessary” (Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa, 2018). 
A multiparty ad hoc Constitutional Review Committee was established in March 2019 to “review and 
amend section 25 of the Constitution to make it possible for the state to expropriate land in the public 
interest without compensation” (Hall, 2018). In December 2018, the National Assembly recognised 
that the Constitutional Review Committee’s (CRC) report on reviewing section 25 of the Constitution 
was accepted by the National Assembly and made the following recommendations:  
Amending section 25 of the Constitution to make it clear what is implied in the Constitution, in 
accordance to expropriation without compensation, as a valid option for land reform, to address the 
injustices of land dispossession of the past, and ensuring that South Africans have equitable access to 
land, food security and agricultural reform mechanisms:  
- Urgently develop mechanisms that would effect the amendment to the applicable division of 
section 25 of the Constitution;  
- Pass a Constitutional Amendment Bill prior to the conclusion of the Fifth Democratic 
Parliament to permit expropriation without compensation (Ad Hoc Committee to Amend 
section 25 of the Constitution, 2019).  
The ANC supports the amendment of the section 25 of the Constitution because it will fast-track 
housing delivery. Housing remains a key priority for the party. It is stipulated in its manifesto that the 
ANC supports the amendment of section 25 of the Constitution and will clearly define the 




The EFF has requested that “section 25 of the Constitution must be amended to make explicit that 
which is implicit in the Constitution with regard to expropriation of land without compensation as a 
legitimate option for land reform so as to address the historic wrongs caused by the arbitrary 
dispossession of land and, in so doing, ensure equitable access to land and further empower the 
majority of South Africans to be productive participants in ownership, food security and agricultural 
reform programmes” (Gerber, 2018). 
According to Dr. Ndlozi, EFF spokesperson, once the amendment to the Constitution has been made 
to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation, it should be followed by an ad hoc 
committee that has been established to develop the proper legislation around expropriation without 
compensation. Following that, consultations with the public, stakeholders, business people, 
academics, etc., should occur to ensure that participation in the policy development is available to 
everyone (Ndlozi, 2018). The question of expropriation of land is different to the question of 
expropriation without compensation. The draft Expropriation Bill states that “property may be 
expropriated only in terms of law of general application … for public interest or public purpose and 
is subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and the manner of payment of which 
have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. The amount of 
compensation and manner of payment must be just and equitable” (2019: 118). If the Constitution 
does not clearly stipulate that land will be expropriated without compensation, individuals will merely 
go to the constitutional court and challenge the expropriation of their land and this will further delay 
land reform in the country (Ndlozi, 2018). 
In the party’s 2019 Manifesto, the EFF stipulated the following:  
An EFF government will ensure that section 25 of the Constitution is amended to allow for 
expropriation of land without compensation. This will allow for equal redistribution of land. It will 
be implemented with immediate effect.  
The EFF wants the constitutional amendment to be explicitly clear that expropriation of land will 
occur without compensation and that land will be in the custodianship of the democratic state (Ndlozi, 
2018). While the land will be in the custodianship of the state, citizens will receive title deeds to the 
land but will not be allowed to sell the land to foreign nationals. The EFF believes that in order to 
restore justice to South African citizens, land that was colonially acquired will belong to the state 
then be used for correcting injustices as well as reconciliation (Ndlozi, 2018). Malema has said that 
each political party has their own stance on land reform programmes, and they will vote in Parliament 




After proposed amendments to the Constitution were made by the ANC and EFF to allow for the 
expropriation of land without compensation, the DA released a statement on 12 March 2018 stating 
that while it supports land restitution and redistribution, it opposes the amendment of the Constitution 
(Business Tech, 2018). The DA leader, Mmusi Maimane stated that property rights are the 
cornerstone of economic growth and development. He added that expropriation without 
compensation is “state-sanctioned theft, which is inimical to economic growth and development” 
(Business Tech, 2018). The Democratic Alliance has revealed that they will step up their plan to 
prevent the expropriation without compensation model from being implemented in the country. 
Parliamentary DA member and shadow Minister of Justice Glynnis Breytenbach has written to 
Thando Modise, the parliamentary speaker that the DA’s complaints should be registered (Head, 
2019). The DA has drawn Parliament’s attention to this section in Breytenbach’s letter that suggests 
that amending the document would be unconstitutional:  
Without a constitutional amendment to section 25 of the Constitution, the State is 
currently able and within its powers to expropriate land for land reform purposes, based 
on just and equitable compensation” (Breytenbach, 2019: 1).  
“If however, the purpose of the amendment is to implement expropriation without 
compensation wholescale and without conditions, then such a motion would offend 
section 1 of the Constitution and would in effect, collapse the core underlying values of 
our Constitution (Breytenbach, 2019: 1). 
Breytenbach argues that “expropriation without compensation has the ability to breakdown the 
country’s economy even further” (Breytenbach, 2019: 1). She raised the “concern that it could enable 
corruption, slamming the billion-rand Mala restitution deal as being overly excessive” (Head, 2019). 
The DA blames the ANC for failed land reform in the country and firmly believes that land reform 
has the capability to be successful within the current framework of the Constitution (Head, 2019). 
Breytenbach maintained that “amending the Constitution is nothing more than an attempt by the ANC 
to hide its failures in land redistribution and reform” (2019: 2). The DA believes that the Constitution 
already includes legitimate initiatives for land reform, that are based on just and equitable 
compensation (Head, 2019).   
The Democratic Alliance opposes “any abrogation of existing private property rights” (2018). 
Property rights are the foundation of “development and economic growth in South Africa” 
(Democratic Allaiance, 2018). The expropriation of land without compensation is government-
authorised theft (Democratic Alliance, 2018). The DA regards the efforts being made to amend the 
Constitution as an attempt by the ruling party to “scapegoat the constitution” for the failure of “land 
reform since the transition to democracy” (Democratic Alliance, 2018). The DA believes that the 




dispossession and expand the ownership of land patterns” (Democratic Alliance,  2018). Land reform 
should be based on the current constitutional framework.   
Following the adoption of the CRC on the potential amendment of “section 25 of the Constitution, 
the National Assembly set up an ad hoc Committee to” manage the amendment process to ensure that 
the Constitution explicitly states what is already implicit in section 25 of the Constitution, in relation 
to the expropriation of land without compensation (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2019). The 
CRC made the following recommendations:  
That section 25 of the Constitution must be amended make explicitly clear what is already “implicit 
in the Constitution with regards to expropriation of land without compensation, as a legitimate 
mechanism of land reform”; 
That parliament must establish a mechanism to manage the amendment; 
Parliament must lay out, process and implement a Constitutional Amendment Bill before the 5th 
Democratic Parliament to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation (Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group, 2019).   
Is a Constitutional Amendment necessary? Professor Ruth Hall, an expert on land reform, argues that 
the Constitution already provides for expropriation without compensation. This was implemented 
during the transition to ensure that those who currently own land do not prevent any form of 
redistribution and restitution from taking place (2018). She contends that these powers have existed 
since the transition. However, the government has chosen not to use their powers to expropriate land 
(Hall (b), 2018). If section 25 of the Constitution is read as a whole, it clearly states that compensation 
is not a mechanism that will hinder land reform. When taking compensation into account as it is stated 
in the Constitution, compensation is only required to be “just and equitable”, not market value 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2019). The main purpose of expropriation should be used as a 
mechanism to “break a deadlock, a tool to speed up matters and to do it cheaply” (Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group, 2019). The issue with expropriation does not lie in the wording of section 25 of 
the Constitution. She cautioned that implementing expropriation of land without compensation 
“would violate even the limitations clause in the Constitution (section 36) as well as section 1, as it 
would treat all people the same without regard for individual circumstances, including whether the 
person was previously disadvantaged or not” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2019). Despite these 
reflections, on 3 December 2019 the ad hoc committee introduced legislation to amend section 25 of 
the Constitution. Members of Parliament were tasked with considering under which circumstances 
expropriation of land without compensation would be applicable. This would need to be included in 




Current approaches to land reform are due to political failure and the ANC has acknowledged that as 
a ruling party, it has failed to confront the land issue and that it could have done so within the 
framework of the constitution. Kgalema Motlanthe, who headed the parliamentary high level panel, 
reported in 2018 that the failings of land reform are not due to constitutional limitations, but rather a 
lack of clear policy administration, weak policy budgets, weak governmental institutions, corruption 
and mismanagement (Hall (b), 2018). While amendments to the Constitution are under review, the 
government will continue to expropriate land, paying an equitable amount of compensation for the 
land (Hall (b), 2018).  
The South African Government already expropriates land for public interest. However, the ANC is 
now considering expropriation for land reform purposes, which it has deemed as necessary. When 
there is a land claim on a specific property, in order to address the historical injustices of land 
dispossession, the constitution already authorises the government to intervene. 
The ANC and EFF, while having different approaches to the implementation of the expropriation of 
land without compensation, have united in support of the motion. The DA, along with other smaller 
opposition parties including the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the African Christian Democratic 
Party (ACDP) firmly oppose this motion.  
 
The divisions on amending the Constitution to allow for the expropriation of land without 
compensation are stark. The DA are opposed, and are rather pushing for title deeds, security, 
restitution and better financial allocations for efficient land reform. Though the ANC and the EFF 
seem to have the same position in accordance to compensation-less expropriation of land and the 
amendment of the Constitution because both their votes are required to reach the two-thirds majority 
threshold, there are still significant differences in their stances on the purpose and extent of 
expropriation, compensation and a constitutional amendment.  
Constitutions are the supreme law of any given country. A constitution consolidates the primary 
decisions made by a country and its citizens. It establishes the basis of social and political life. 
Therefore, it is important that constitutions are “foundational and enduring” (Bockenforde, 2017: 4). 
If they are to endure, it is essential that they respond to the changing circumstances within the country. 
Constitutions should allow for amendment for the following reasons: 1) adjusting the Constitution to 
the environment the political system operates in; 2) correcting the provisions that have proved to be 




Section 25 of the Constitution already allows for the expropriation of land without compensation in 
the public interest. The question that should be asked is whether amending section 25 of the 
Constitution is necessary if it already allows for the expropriation of land without compensation?  
Amending section 25 of the Constitution to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation 
was adopted by the National Assembly in July 2019. The ad hoc committee on land reform had until 
31 May 2020 to conclude its work. However, the committee did not conclude its work. Phakathi has 
stated that it is unlikely that the land issue will be finalised in 2020 due to the restrictions the Covid-
19 lockdown has imposed on public gatherings (2020). 
5.3.3 Summary analysis: Extent of elite consensus on institutional rules of the 
game and codes of political conduct 
The section discussed political parties’ individual stance towards each other and towards the broader 
political institutions and the Constitutional framework within which they operate. In particular, the 
section discussed the extent to which these elites accept one another as legitimate participants in the 
political process, accept the political institutions they frequent (Parliament) as legitimate, and whether 
they especially accept the legitimacy of the Constitutional order. This section concludes that while 
elites cooperate within the parliamentary arena and tolerate each other, some elite groupings do not 
necessarily accept one another as legitimate participants in the political process. The call by two major 
political elites to amend the Constitution calls into question the extent to which they are willing to 
find policy solutions within the current constitutional framework. It is important to note that political 
elites have not made use of unconstitutional means to achieve their goals in relation to their vision of 
land reform. Political elites have conducted debates and parliamentary meetings within the framework 







Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This study has analysed the three major parties’ values and policies on land reform. The aim of this 
study was to determine whether there is sufficient consensus among political elites on land reform. It 
has been identified that there is consensus among the political elites that land reform is vital policy. 
However, there is a lack of agreement  on how land reform should be achieved. The ANC and the 
EFF have agreed that the Constitution should be amended to allow for the expropriation of land 
without compensation. However, the ANC and EFF do not share a common vision for the policy 
outcome of this Constitutional amendment. The DA has argued that there is no need to amend the 
Constitution to allow for the expropriation of land without compensation because the Constitution 
already allows for this in the public interest or for public purposes. Each political party has its own 
focus on land reform initiatives and the outcomes these initiatives should achieve.  
This thesis uses two indicators to measure elite consensus, namely 1) procedural and institutional 
consensus and 2) consensus on core values and agreement over vital policy matters. In accordance to 
procedural and institutional consensus, it is clear that there is agreement among the political elites on 
democratic procedures and rules of the democratic game. Political elites accept one another as 
legitimate participants in the political process. While their debates in parliament, committee meetings, 
etc. may be robust and irrational, this should not be confused with a lack of consensus on the rules of 
game.  
In relation to consensus on core values and agreement on vital policy issues, political elites do share 
core values underpinning land reform. Political elites within each political party studied here agree 
that land reform is a vital policy issue and that land redistribution should be administered. However, 
they do not share a common vision on the policy of land reform. The DA, the EFF and the ANC each 
have their own vision for how land reform should be implemented and the outcomes they find most 
essential. Nevertheless, this lack of agreement on the vision of land reform policy should is not 
sufficient to undermine elite consensus in general.    
One can argue that there is in fact consensus on the rules of the game, as well as democratic 
procedures. Political elites have carried out political debates on land reform within a democratic 
framework, even if it is somewhat robust and frictional at times. The existing lack of agreement  on 
some ideological (values) issues is not sufficient to undermine elite consensus in general. Animosity 
and friction during these debates on land reform should not be confused with a lack of consensus on 




Elite consensus theory has argued that if political elites do not agree on the rules of democratic 
procedures, the democratic consolidation process will be hindered. The existing lack of agreement on 
some ideological (values) issues is insufficient to undermine elite consensus on the rules of the game. 
Sniderman et al (1991: 349) has argued that if political elites disunite to the point where they cannot 
agree on a policy solution, the policy process itself will be hindered. Therefore, South Africa’s 
democratic consolidation process will not be hindered by a lack of consensus on ideological issues 
on land reform because elite consensus on the rules of the game has shown to be important to South 
African political elites. South African political elites can be considered “consensually unified”. 
There were limitations in analysing the comparisons in Chapter 4, as the data used in this study was 
only secondary data. There was also a limitation with regard to using case studies because there were 
not sufficient case studies that referred directly to elite consensus on land reform in South Africa.  
This thesis has achieved the mentioning and analysis of the positions and policies of political elites 
within the ANC, the DA and the EFF on the land question in South Africa. Chapter 4 presents a 
deduction of the need for South African political elites to become more cooperative and less 
condescending and antagonistic. It is clear that this antagonistic and unparliamentary behaviour has 
hindered effective decision-making in relation to addressing the land question. It is clear that South 
African elites struggle to reach a consensus on any policy issue. The policy process is continuously 
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